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ABSTRACT—For much of the last forty years, ERISA’s church plan 
exemption has existed quietly without much fanfare. But increased 
litigation over the last five years has dragged the exemption into the 
spotlight. The litigation focuses on religiously affiliated hospital systems 
and whether their pension plans have been correctly classified as church 
plans exempt from ERISA. 
This Note examines the history behind the church plan exemption, 
including statutory modifications made in 1980 and the IRS’s longstanding 
interpretation of these changes, which precipitated the dispute at issue in 
the current wave of litigation. While the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent 
decision in Advocate Health Care Network v. Stapleton endorsed a broad 
interpretation of the scope of the church plan exemption, this Note argues 
that Congress should revisit the church plan exemption and implement a 
more balanced approach to granting and evaluating church plan status. A 
more robust evaluation of church plan applicants would strike a balance 
between pension participants’ concerns around plan funding and other 
ERISA protections, and the needs of good faith church plan operators with 
valid religious affiliations.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Over the course of thirty-five years, Mary Petti “worked her way up 
from nurse to vice president for patient care services at the Hospital Center 
at Orange” in Orange, New Jersey.1 She expected to retire in a few years 
with a pension benefit from the hospital.2 During a staff meeting in 2003, 
hospital executives informed Mary and other employees of the Hospital 
Center at Orange that the hospital was facing serious financial problems.3 
When employees inquired about the safety of their pensions, the executives 
informed them that the hospital’s plan was a church plan exempt from the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).4 They 





4 Id.; Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 
(2012). 
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explained this meant there was no guarantee that the plan’s pension 
benefits would be paid.5 This announcement came much to the surprise of 
Mary, who “felt that [her] pension was safe” and considered herself an 
employee of a secular hospital.6 The hospital sold off its equipment and real 
estate, and officially closed in 2004, leaving its pension fund with just fifty-
one cents for every dollar it had promised.7 
To understand why church plan status matters, it is important to 
understand why ERISA exists in the first place. ERISA was enacted, in 
part, to provide stronger protections and security for the pensions of 
American workers when faced with the unfortunate situation of their 
current or former employers going out of business and taking with them 
any funds to pay for promised pensions.8 For this reason, ERISA, which 
multiple federal agencies oversee, sets extensive federal requirements that 
apply broadly to most private retirement and welfare plans. Pension plans 
must meet reporting and disclosure requirements enforced by the 
Department of Labor (DOL); follow vesting, benefit accrual, and funding 
requirements administered by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS); and pay 
premiums to the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), a federal 
insurance program that guarantees a certain level of benefits to participants 
and beneficiaries when their pension plans fail.9 
The congressional authors of ERISA carved out a few exceptions from 
these extensive requirements, with the church plan exemption among 
them.10 For the most part, the language of the church plan definition today 
looks relatively similar to its original 1974 form, as Congress has only 
enacted one round of statutory clarification, which took place in 1980.11 
Likewise, the interpretation and application of the church plan definition by 
the IRS, as well as other federal agencies, has remained relatively 
5 Walsh, supra note 1. 
6 Id. 
7 Id.; Mary Williams Walsh, I.R.S. Reversal on ‘Church’ Pension Plan Rescues a Fund, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 1, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/02/business/an-irs-reversal-rescues-a-pension-
fund.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/5G8J-WSUF]. 
8 See 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a). Congressional findings included that “many employees with long years 
of employment are losing . . . retirement benefits,” “the soundness and stability of plans with respect to 
adequate funds to pay promised benefits may be endangered,” and because plans were being terminated 
“before requisite funds have been accumulated, employees and their beneficiaries have been deprived 
of anticipated benefits.” Id. 
9 COLLEEN E. MEDILL, INTRODUCTION TO EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW: POLICY AND PRACTICE 31–
32 (4th ed. 2015). 
10 ERISA § 4, 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(2). Although church plans are exempt from ERISA, they 
remain subject to certain Tax Code provisions that preexisted ERISA. See 26 U.S.C. § 414(e) (2012). 
11 Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-364, § 407, 94 Stat. 
1208, 1303–04 (1980). 
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consistent over time. The IRS has disseminated its longstanding 
interpretation of what constitutes a church plan through a series of 
administrative rulings, including a 1982 General Counsel Memorandum12 
and a string of private letter rulings (PLRs), which are determinations 
issued to taxpayers upon request. Through this process and over several 
decades, a variety of religiously affiliated entities, including hospitals with 
religious ties, have sought and obtained PLRs from the IRS to affirm their 
operation of church plans. 
For much of the last forty years, ERISA’s church plan exemption has 
existed quietly without much fanfare. However, increased litigation over 
the last five years concerning what it means to establish a church plan has 
dragged the exemption into the spotlight, ultimately landing the issue 
before the U.S. Supreme Court in Advocate Health Care Network v. 
Stapleton. The litigation focuses on religiously affiliated hospital systems 
like the Hospital Center of Orange and whether their pension plans have 
been correctly classified as church plans exempt from ERISA. 
With the benefit of hindsight, it seems apparent that the IRS’s 
longstanding interpretation of the statute and issuance of church plan PLRs 
under that interpretation created room for tension as to what it means to 
establish a church plan. This tension is illustrated by religiously affiliated 
entities that have been relying—some acting in good faith and others 
perhaps less so13—on obtaining these rulings to operate their plans as 
ERISA-exempt church plans. As a consequence of these entities being able 
to operate their plans outside the bounds of ERISA, the plans’ pension 
participants have not received the same protections afforded to secular, 
private sector pension participants by ERISA. 
The IRS’s unwavering interpretation, disseminated through non-
precedential PLRs and augmented by similar interpretations and 
confirmations by the DOL and PBGC, bears some of the responsibility for 
the current wave of litigation. Other factors may also be responsible for 
exacerbating the tension, such as increasing consolidation within the 
hospital industry over the last twenty years14 and allegations around the 
12 I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,007, 1983 WL 197946, at *6 (July 1, 1983). 
13 See, e.g., Walsh, supra note 7. 
14 See, e.g., Alison Evans Cuellar & Paul J. Gertler, Trends in Hospital Consolidation: The 
Formation of Local Systems, 22 HEALTH AFF. 77, 77 (2003) (noting “profound changes in how the 
hospital industry organizes itself” including the “extensive consolidation of hospitals through merger 
and the rising importance of hospital systems”). Many hospitals, including religiously affiliated ones, 
have expanded or consolidated into larger hospital systems that employ thousands of employees and 
earn “multibillion-dollar annual revenues that rival some Fortune 500 companies.” Melanie Evans, 
Consolidation Creating Giant Hospital Systems, MOD. HEALTHCARE (June 21, 2014), 
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motivations of entities pursuing church plan status, particularly when 
church plan status is sought after a long history of operating as an ERISA 
plan or where the religious affiliations are loose-fitting.15 
This Note examines the issues that have sprung up in this series of 
litigation and where the IRS position aligns or does not align with judicial 
interpretations of the statute. Unlike the other literature covering this 
church plan litigation series, which focuses mainly on the judicial 
outcomes, this Note proposes a solution outside the courts. Because the 
Supreme Court was constrained by the boundaries of statutory 
interpretation and could only go so far in devising a creative solution, the 
church plan litigation resulted in the reinforcement of the status quo. 
Instead, this Note suggests that a balanced legislative approach should be 
implemented to allow the church plan exemption to continue to exist for 
good faith church plan operators while addressing the concerns voiced by 
pension plan participants. 
Part I of this Note provides a brief history of the origins of ERISA’s 
church plan exemption and the 1980 amendments, which “clarified” the 
definition of church plan but created some confusion as to what entities 
could establish a church plan. Next, Part I examines the IRS’s private letter 
ruling process and explores how it functions with regard to ERISA’s 
church plan exemption, specifically discussing the history of the issuance 
of more than 500 church plan PLRs. 
Part II of this Note explores the recent wave of class action litigation 
against religiously affiliated nonprofit hospital systems that operate their 
pension plans as church plans, and the role PLRs play in the litigation. It 
then examines the Supreme Court decision in Advocate Health Care 
Network v. Stapleton, which endorsed a broad interpretation of the church 
plan exemption. 
Part III explores some alternative solutions that could be implemented 
to resolve the disputes between church plans and the participants seeking 
more protections. Part III also explains the importance of revisiting the 




15 See, e.g., Oral Argument at 25:45–28:53, Stapleton v. Advocate Health Care Network, 817 F.3d 
517 (7th Cir. 2016) (No. 15-1368) [hereinafter Stapleton Oral Argument], http://
media.ca7.uscourts.gov/sound/2015/nr.15-1368.15-1368_09_18_2015.mp3 [https://perma.cc/C6SH-
JEBV] (plaintiff’s counsel, when questioned about hospitals’ motivations to seek church plan status, 
discussing his opinion that many large commercial hospital chains were persuaded by benefits 
consultants to seek church plan status to skirt ERISA). 
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Finally, Part IV argues that Congress should take a more balanced 
approach to granting and evaluating church plan status by implementing a 
more robust evaluation of church plan applicants, including a closer 
examination of the funding aspects of the plans, the strength of their 
religious ties, and their rationales for seeking church plan status. A 
multifactor approach such as this will help serve as a gatekeeper to prevent 
those plans acting in bad faith (e.g., entities with very attenuated religious 
connections looking to skirt ERISA compliance) from obtaining church 
plan status, while protecting those religious entities that simply may not 
have realized their eligibility for church plan status.  
I. ERISA’S CHURCH PLAN EXEMPTION AND THE ROLE OF THE IRS
A. The Roots of the Church Plan Exemption
When it enacted ERISA in 1974, Congress carved the expansive law 
into four Titles and assigned three different federal agencies responsibility 
for enforcing and administering them.16 Title I covers a number of areas, 
including reporting and disclosure requirements for all employee benefit 
plans; minimum participation, vesting, benefit accrual, and funding rules 
for pension plans; fiduciary requirements; ERISA’s civil litigation 
enforcement mechanism; and state law preemption.17 Title II amended the 
Internal Revenue Code (the Tax Code) to align its requirements for 
participation, vesting, benefit accrual, and funding of qualified retirement 
plans with the requirements established in Title I.18 Title III established the 
dual authority of the Departments of Labor and Treasury to enforce Titles I 
and II.19 Title IV created a federal pension insurance program to serve as a 
safety net when pension plans terminate and the PBGC, a new agency, to 
operate it.20 
Due to conflicting interpretations of ERISA by the DOL and Treasury, 
a 1978 reorganization plan clarified the division of jurisdiction between the 
two agencies.21 The reorganization assigned the DOL primary jurisdiction 
over certain Title I areas, including reporting and disclosure, fiduciary 




20 Id. at 31–32. 
21 U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, EXECUTIVE ORDER: REORGANIZATION PLAN NO. 4 OF 1978 (1978), 
https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ebsa/laws-and-regulations/laws/executive-orders/4 [https://perma.cc/
KSK2-M2JY]; see also MEDILL, supra note 9, at 32. 
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responsibility, and administration and enforcement of Title I.22 The 
Treasury Department and IRS have primary responsibility for the Title I 
standards for pension plans and the Tax Code’s qualified plan 
requirements.23 
The congressional authors of ERISA carved out a few exceptions from 
these extensive requirements, with the church plan exemption among them. 
Congress originally defined a church plan as one “established and 
maintained for its employees by a church or by a convention or association 
of churches.”24 The statute also allowed church plans to provide coverage 
to employees of church agencies25 under a sunset provision.26 In shielding 
religious entities from ERISA’s requirements, Congress intended to avoid 
government entanglement with church business.27 In addition, while the 
legislative history sheds no light on this, some have speculated the 
22 MEDILL, supra note 9, at 32. 
23 Id. 
24 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 3(33)(A), 88 Stat. 
829, 838 (1974). After the 1980 amendments, this part of the definition, 29 U.S.C. § 1002(33)(A), now 
reads: “The term ‘church plan’ means a plan established and maintained (to the extent required in 
clause (ii) of subparagraph (B)) for its employees (or their beneficiaries) by a church or by a convention 
or association of churches which is exempt from tax under section 501 of title 26.” 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1002(33)(A) (2012); see also 26 U.S.C. § 414(e)(1) (2012) (providing a parallel provision in the Tax
Code). The versions of the church plan provisions in Chapter 29 (DOL version) and Chapter 26 (Tax
Code version) of the U.S. Code are, in most respects, nearly identical; however, one difference between
them are headings that Congress inserted in the Tax Code provisions. See Jeffrey A. Herman, Resolving
ERISA’s “Church Plan” Problem, 31 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 231, 243–48 (2016) (arguing that the
existence of these headings supports a broad interpretation of the church plan exemption).
25 Common examples of church agencies are church-affiliated hospitals, nursing homes, and 
parochial schools. The term “agency of a church” is defined as “an organization . . . exempt from 
tax . . . which is either controlled by, or associated with, a church.” 26 C.F.R. § 1.414(e)-1(d)(2) (2015). 
An organization is “controlled by a church” if “a majority of [its] officers or directors are appointed by 
a church’s governing board or by officials of a church,” and “[a]n organization is associated with a 
church if it shares common religious bonds and convictions with that church.” Id. Senator Herman 
Talmadge described church agencies’ function as “essential to the churches’ mission. They are for the 
sick and needy and disseminate religious instruction. They are, in fact, part of the churches.” 125 CONG. 
REC. 10,052 (1979). 
26 See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(33)(C) (repealed 1980) (“[A] plan in existence on January 1, 1974, shall be 
treated as a ‘church plan’ if it is established and maintained by a church . . . for its employees and 
employees of one of more agencies of such church . . . for the employees of such church . . . and the 
employees of one or more agencies of such church . . . and if such church . . . and each such agency is 
exempt from tax . . . [expiring after] December 31, 1982.”). 
27 See 124 CONG. REC. 12,106 (1978) (statement of Rep. Conable) (explaining that Congress 
“exempted church plans from the provisions of [ERISA] to avoid excessive Government entanglement 
with religion in violation of the first amendment to the Constitution”); see also S. REP. No. 93-383, at 
81 (1973) (discussing the committee’s concerns “that the examinations of books and records” 
conducted in the “administration of the [PBGC] insurance system” could be considered “an unjustified 
invasion of the confidential relationship that is believed to be appropriate with regard to churches and 
their religious activities”). 
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exemption was provided based on Congress’s “belief that churches have a 
particularly strong moral commitment to their employees and are likely to 
keep the pension promises they make to their employees.”28  
Due to how the responsibility for ERISA has been split among the 
three agencies, the IRS bears much of the responsibility for overseeing 
church pension plans; however, the DOL and PBGC do encounter church 
plan issues as well, as the rest of this Part further explains. There are two 
types of church plans: nonelecting church plans and electing church plans. 
Nonelecting church plans do not have to meet the funding, vesting, 
reporting and disclosure requirements under ERISA Title I.29 They are also 
exempt from paying premiums into the PBGC insurance system as required 
under ERISA Title IV,30 which means participants and beneficiaries of 
nonelecting church plans do not have the protections of the PBGC safety 
net insurance system. These nonelecting church plans, however, remain 
subject to the Tax Code’s qualified plan provisions that preexisted ERISA, 
which require a plan to satisfy certain participation, vesting, and funding 
requirements in order to receive qualified tax treatment.31 Electing church 
plans, on the other hand, are those that qualify for church plan status, but 
nonetheless opt into ERISA under Section 410(d) of the Tax Code.32 If a 
church or convention or association of churches that maintains any church 
plan makes such an election, certain provisions of the Tax Code and Title I 
of ERISA apply to the church plan as if the plan were not a church plan.33 
Once made, such an election is irrevocable.34 
In 1977, the Department of Treasury and the IRS issued proposed 
regulations under Section 414(e) of the Tax Code to implement ERISA’s 
28 Norman Stein, An Article of Faith: The Gratuity Theory of Pensions and Faux Church Plans, 
A.B.A. EMP. BENEFITS COMMITTEE NEWSL. (Am. Bar Ass’n, Chi., Ill.), Summer 2014, 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/newsletter/groups/labor_law/ebc_newsletter/14_sum_ebc_news/fai
th.html [https://perma.cc/G5DR-P7UY]. 
29 ERISA § 4(b)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(2) (2012). 
30 ERISA § 4021(b)(3), § 1321(b)(3). 
31 26 U.S.C. § 401(a) (2012); see also Rev. Proc. 2011-44, § 2, 2011-39 I.R.B. 446, 446. 
32 26 U.S.C. § 410(d). 
33 26 C.F.R. § 1.410(d)-1 (2015). Electing church plans are subject to Tax Code  
section 410 (relating to minimum participation standards), section 411 (relating to minimum 
vesting standards), section 412 (relating to minimum funding standards), section 4975 (relating 
to prohibited transactions), and paragraphs (11), (12), (13), (14), (15), and (19) of section 401(a) 
(relating to joint and survivor annuities, mergers and consolidations, assignment or alienation of 
benefits, time of benefit commencement, certain social security increases, and withdrawals of 
employee contributions, respectively). 
Id. 
34 26 U.S.C. § 410(d)(2). 
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statutory church plan requirements.35 The regulations provided that 
religious orders or organizations would only be captured in the definition of 
“church” where such an order or organization is an integral part of a church 
and is engaged in carrying out the function of a church.36 In one of its initial 
interpretations of the church plan definition and the proposed Treasury 
regulations, the IRS found that pension plans established and maintained by 
religious orders that operated hospitals as part of their missions were not 
church plans because the orders were not performing “church functions” as 
defined in the statute and proposed regulations.37 
The proposed regulations and the upcoming expiration of the sunset 
provision troubled many churches that would have had to divide their 
pension plans into two by 1982, one covering church employees and one 
covering employees of other affiliated agencies.38 These churches and other 
religious organizations lobbied Congress to encourage it to broaden the 
church plan definition.39 In response to these concerns, Congress amended 
the ERISA church plan definition in 1980 to clarify its scope.40 This 
amendment retained the original definition in 29 U.S.C. § 1002(33)(A) but 
replaced Subsection (33)(C) to address the expiration of the sunset 
provision on coverage of church agency employees and whether the 
definition included plans maintained by church pension boards.41 The 
amended 29 U.S.C. § 1002(33)(C),42 which has remained unchanged since 
1980, reads in relevant part:  
A plan established and maintained for its employees (or their beneficiaries) by 
a church or by a convention or association of churches includes a plan 
maintained by an organization, whether a civil law corporation or otherwise, 
the principal purpose or function of which is the administration or funding of a 
plan or program for the provision of retirement benefits or welfare benefits, or 
35 See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.414(e)-1, 42 Fed. Reg. 18,621, 18,621 (Apr. 8, 1977). 
36 See id. at 18,623. 
37 See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,266, 1977 WL 46200, at *1 (Sept. 22, 1977). The IRS later 
changed course and revoked this General Counsel Memorandum in a subsequent General Counsel 
Memorandum in 1982. See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,007, 1983 WL 197946, at *6 (July 1, 1983). 
38 See 125 CONG. REC. 10,052 (1979) (statement of Sen. Talmadge) (describing the legal, actuarial, 
and accounting hurdles church plans will undergo to initially divide existing church plans and then 
continue operating multiple plans for different segments of employees). 
39 See e.g., 125 CONG. REC. 10,054–58 (statement of Sen. Talmadge) (publishing letters from a 
variety of religious organizations and churches urging changes to ERISA’s church plan exemption). 
40 Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-364, § 407, 94 Stat. 
1208, 1303–04 (1980). 
41 See 125 CONG. REC. 10,052–53 (statement of Sen. Talmadge) (explaining that when Congress 
set the 1982 sunset expiration, it “did not recognize the unique character and needs of . . . church plans” 
and that the legislation would clarify that plans administered by pension boards meeting certain 
requirements would be considered church plans). 
42 The parallel provision in the Tax Code is 26 U.S.C. § 414(e)(3)(A) (2012). 
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both, for the employees of a church or a convention or association of 
churches, if such organization is controlled by or associated with a church or a 
convention or association of churches.43 
At issue in the current church plan litigation series are the meaning of the 
terms “established and maintained” and “includes,” and the interaction 
between Subsection C and Subsection A of the statute.  
Based on the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act 
modifications, in 1982 the IRS changed course and revoked its 1977 
General Counsel Memorandum44 in a subsequent General Counsel 
Memorandum.45 This reversal, of course, laid the foundation for the IRS’s 
longstanding interpretation of what constitutes a church plan, which 
recognizes the possibility for establishment of church plans by entities 
affiliated with churches, not just establishment solely by churches. The IRS 
has espoused this interpretation through a series of PLRs, which are 
discussed in the next two Sections of Part I. Since amending ERISA’s 
church plan definition in 1980, Congress has since made occasional 
adjustments to it.46 However, none of the legislative tweaks have been 
significant enough to cause the IRS to shift its longstanding interpretation. 
The most recent legislative development related to church plans was the 
Church Plan Clarification Act of 2015, enacted in December 2015.47 While 
the legislation did address the application of certain technical retirement 
plan rules to church plans,48 the Senate bill’s co-sponsor, Senator Ben 
Cardin of Maryland, made clear in his floor statement that the bill’s 
43 29 U.S.C. § 1002(33)(C)(i) (2012). The amendment also added that the term “employee of a 
church” includes “an employee of an organization . . . which is exempt from tax . . . and which is 
controlled by or associated with a church.” Id. § 1002(33)(C)(ii)(II). In addition, it provided that “[a]n 
organization . . . is associated with a church . . . if it shares common religious bonds and convictions 
with that church.” Id. § 1002(33)(C)(iv). 
44 See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,007, 1983 WL 197946, at *6 (July 1, 1983) (revoking the 1977 
General Counsel Memorandum). 
45 See id. (finding a retirement plan covering the lay employees of a religious order whose main 
activity is operating nursing homes or hospitals may be a church plan if the requirements of § 414(e) are 
met). 
46 See, e.g., Church Plan Parity and Entanglement Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 106-244, § 2, 114 
Stat. 499, 499–500 (2000) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1144a (2012)) (clarifying the church plan definition 
as related to church welfare plans, which are church plans that provide health and welfare benefits as 
opposed to church pension plans that provide retirement benefits). 
47 Church Plan Clarification Act of 2015, enacted as part of Consolidated Appropriations Act, 
2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113, § 336, 129 Stat. 2242, 3109–10 (2015). 
48 The legislation provides certain technical fixes for church plans, including the application of IRS 
controlled group rules, the participation of church plans in automatic enrollment schemes, church plan 
transfers and mergers, and investments by church plans in collective trusts. Id. 
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purpose was not to provide commentary on the church plan definition.49 
The following two Sections will trace the history of the PLR and how the 
IRS has espoused this interpretation through a series of church plan PLRs.   
B. IRS Private Letter Ruling Process
IRS administrative guidance comes in a variety of forms, including 
letter rulings, closing agreements, compliance statements, determination 
letters, opinion letters, advisory letters, information letters, revenue rulings, 
and oral advice.50 A PLR is a written statement issued to a taxpayer that 
interprets and applies the tax laws to that taxpayer’s specific set of facts.51 
PLRs are an outgrowth of the IRS’s initial plans during the early stages of 
modern income tax law to answer any question it received from 
taxpayers.52 In the 1930s, Congress gave the agency the authority to enter 
into “closing agreements”—legally binding agreements reviewed and 
approved by high-level officials—with taxpayers regarding prospective 
transactions.53 From this, the agency sought to develop a less formal 
procedure that was not binding, and the PLR was born.54 A PLR is 
applicable only to the specific taxpayer to whom it is issued55 and may not 
be used or cited as precedent.56 
The IRS’s current process for issuing a PLR has some basic review 
mechanisms but could certainly be more rigorous. Letter rulings are 
typically issued under the Chief Counsel’s Office by various Associate 
49 See 161 CONG. REC. S8302 (daily ed. Dec. 2, 2015) (statement of Sen. Cardin) (“[N]o inference 
is intended by this legislation regarding the statutory requirements a pension plan must meet to be 
considered or treated as a ‘church plan’ . . . . Rather, the Church Plan Clarification Act is simply about 
fixing the rules that govern how church plans operate and serve their participants.”); see also Hazel 
Bradford, Senate Passes Church Pension Plan Clarifications, PENSIONS & INV. (Dec. 14, 2015, 4:15 
PM), http://www.pionline.com/article/20151214/ONLINE/151219939/senate-passes-church-pension-
plan-clarifications [https://perma.cc/45QZ-VTUG]. 
50 Rev. Proc. 2015-4, § 3.01, 2015-1 I.R.B. 144, 149. 
51 26 C.F.R. § 601.201(a)(2) (2015); see also Rev. Proc. 2015-4, § 3.02, 2015-1 I.R.B. 144, 149. 
52 Dale Rubin, Private Letter and Revenue Rulings: Remedy or Ruse?, 28 N. KY. L. REV. 50, 51
(2001). 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 51–52. 
55 Rev. Proc. 2015-4, § 13.02, 2015-1 I.R.B. 144, 173. 
56 26 U.S.C. § 6110(k)(3) (2012) (“Unless . . . otherwise establish[ed] by regulations, a written 
determination may not be used or cited as precedent.”). But see Judy Kwok, The Perils of Bright Lines: 
Section 6110(k)(3) and the Ambiguous Precedential Status of Written Determinations, 24 VA. TAX REV. 
863, 867 (2005) (discussing the confusion surrounding the ambiguities of § 6110(k)(3)); Lisa Marie 
Starczewski, IRS National Office Procedures — Rulings, Closing Agreements, 621-3d Tax Mgmt. 
(BNA) § II(F)(5) (2016) (“Despite . . . clear expression of congressional intent, both taxpayers and 
courts have often disregarded § 6110(k)(3) in whole or in part and have given precedential value to 
written determinations.”). 
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Chief Counsel departments.57 Staff attorneys at an IRS branch office 
provide the initial review of the facts stated in a taxpayer’s request, conduct 
research on issues raised by the facts, and create a draft ruling.58 The branch 
chief provides review and final sign-off on the ruling, although it may 
receive an additional random review by the Assistant Chief Counsel.59 The 
PLR is then provided to the taxpayer,60 and after identifying details and 
other confidential data are removed from the ruling, it, like any other 
written determination, is available for public inspection.61 
C. IRS Church Plan PLR History
A church plan can take advantage of the ERISA exemption without a 
PLR from the IRS; nonetheless, in practice most hospitals and other 
religiously affiliated entities request PLRs because they offer confirmation 
of their plans’ status for tax purposes, and because other agencies may 
require a plan to obtain one.62 The analysis provided in the church plan 
PLRs is arguably formulaic, evidenced by the similarities of the content 
across rulings63 and the volume of rulings issued.64 The significance of the 
volume of these types of determinations being issued and relied upon by 
church plans is further magnified by the fact that other federal agencies 
predominantly rely on the IRS’s issuance of a PLR as the basis for their 
recognition of church plans. For example, because of the DOL’s and IRS’s 
overlapping administrative jurisdiction over ERISA provisions, the DOL 
57 MICHAEL I. SALTZMAN & LESLIE BOOK, IRS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE ¶ 3.05, Westlaw 
(database updated 2016). 
58 Id. ¶ 3.05[5]. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 26 U.S.C. § 6110(a) (2012). 
62 Rev. Proc. 2011-44, § 2, 2011-39 I.R.B. 446, 446. 
63 See Brief for Appellee at 46, Stapleton v. Advocate Health Care Network, 817 F.3d 517 (7th Cir. 
2016) (No. 15-1368) (“The PLRs . . . merely follow the conclusion of the [General Counsel 
Memorandum issued in 1982], without analysis.” (citation omitted)). But see G. Daniel Miller, The 
Church Plan Definition—A Reply to Norm Stein, A.B.A. EMP. BENEFITS COMMITTEE NEWSL. (Am. Bar 
Ass’n, Chi., Ill.), Fall 2014, at n.67, http://www.americanbar.org/content/newsletter/groups/labor_law/
ebc_newsletter/14_fall_ebc_news/church.html [https://perma.cc/V38M-J6V6] (arguing that IRS church 
plan PLRs are well-reasoned because “[t]hey all contain a comprehensive listing of the facts underlying 
each ruling request, followed by a recitation of the applicable statutory language and agency guidance, 
and then they apply that language and guidance to the facts presented”). 
64 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 16, Dignity Health v. Rollins, 137 S. Ct. 547 (2016) (No. 
16-258) [hereinafter Rollins Petition for Writ of Certiorari] (estimating 500 church plan PLRs issued
since the 1980s); Kristen Ricaurte Knebel, IRS Mum as Hospital Church Plan Lawsuits Continue,
BLOOMBERG BNA (July 14, 2016), http://www.bna.com/irs-mum-hospital-n73014444689/
[https://perma.cc/3Z8Y-TZKE] (“Approximately 300 religiously affiliated hospitals have received these
PLRs.”). 
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has also analyzed church plan status and issued similar administrative 
rulings; however, the decisions rendered in DOL advisory opinions often 
rely in part on whether the IRS has issued the entity a PLR.65 The PBGC is 
similarly deferential to the IRS’s determinations, noting that it “typically 
does not make church plan determinations, [and] rel[ies] instead upon IRS 
church plan determinations.”66  
The IRS issued church plan PLRs on a relatively systematic basis 
starting in the 1980s. Events over the next two decades, however, raised 
questions about their issuance, culminating in a moratorium on church plan 
PLRs lasting from 2007 until 2011.67 First, in 1993, the PBGC announced 
that it would impose a six-year limitation on refunds of PBGC premiums.68 
In other words, plan sponsors who had previously operated their pension 
plans as ERISA plans and had accordingly paid annual premiums to the 
PBGC, but who subsequently determined their plans were not subject to 
ERISA (i.e., that they qualified as a church plan), now had only a six-year 
window to seek refunds of those premiums. This motivated plan sponsors 
to confirm their church plan status with the IRS in order to pursue refunds 
within the new statute of limitations.69 From 2000 to 2010, more than one 
hundred religiously affiliated employers with pension plans took this path 
and made the switch from ERISA-compliant plans to church plans.70 This 
shift caused enough concern that the IRS in 2007 instituted a moratorium to 
pause any new church plan PLRs.71 In relinquishing their ERISA plan 
status for church plan status, these employers also relinquished the pension 
65 See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Advisory Opinion Letter 2004-11A, Re: Diversity of Coverage, 
Reporting and Disclosure (Dec. 30, 2004) (“Section 3(33) of ERISA defines the term ‘church plan’ 
using language virtually identical to Code section 414(e). Conditioned on the accuracy on your 
representation concerning the current structure and operation of the [entities], and the Plans not being 
materially different from facts on which the IRS based its . . . private letter ruling, the [DOL] sees no 
reason to disagree with the IRS’s conclusion. Accordingly, . . . it is the view of the [DOL] that the Plans 
constitute ‘church plans’ within the meaning of section 3(33) of Title I of ERISA.”). 
66 PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP., QUESTIONS TO THE PBGC AND SUMMARY OF THEIR 
RESPONSES 25 (2011). 
67 See Walsh, supra note 7. 
68 Refunds of Premium Notice, 58 Fed. Reg. 63,407 (Dec. 1, 1993). 
69 According to one media report, from 1999–2007, the PBGC refunded nearly $18 million in 
premiums to eighty-six employers claiming the church plan exemption. See Ellen Schultz, IRS Nears 
Action on Church Pensions, WALL ST. J. (June 5, 2010, 12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB10001424052748704080104575286960632243300 [https://perma.cc/4FYW-NCJV]. 
70 See id. 
71  See Walsh, supra note 7. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
1294 
safety net the PBGC provides under ERISA, which proved to have 
detrimental effects for some pension participants.72  
One example where participants faced detrimental effects is the 
Hospital Center at Orange, where Mary Petti worked, which garnered 
significant media attention.73 The hospital originally operated its pension 
plan as an ERISA plan, which afforded its participants and beneficiaries 
PBGC coverage in the case of plan failure.74 In 1998, the hospital became 
affiliated with Cathedral Healthcare System Inc., which was a corporation 
of the Archdiocese of Newark.75 In 2003, the hospital sought and received 
an IRS PLR confirming its pension plan’s church plan status, which 
eliminated its ERISA obligations along with its participants’ PBGC 
protection.76 One year later, the hospital closed down its operations and laid 
off its employees, leaving behind an estimated $20–$30 million pension 
shortfall.77 Plan participants and beneficiaries sued the PBGC, the IRS, and 
the Hospital Center at Orange, among others, challenging the legality of the 
church plan classification.78 The court found the suit was premature: no 
injury had occurred because the IRS was in the midst of reconsidering its 
church plan ruling and no PBGC benefits had yet been denied.79 After 
nearly a decade in limbo, in 2013, the IRS ultimately revoked the Hospital 
at Orange’s church plan PLR, and the PBGC subsequently reversed course 
to reinstate PBGC coverage for the hospital’s pension plan beneficiaries.80 
Meanwhile, the IRS lifted its moratorium on church plan PLRs in 
201181 when it issued Revenue Procedure 2011-44, which created more 
transparency in the church plan PLR application process.82 The Revenue 
Procedure created a new requirement for nonelecting church plan PLR 
72 See, e.g., Schultz, supra note 69 (discussing a religiously affiliated publishing house that 
terminated its church plan that was only 36% funded, leaving employees with only 40–60% of their 
promised benefits). 
73 See Walsh, supra note 1; see also Workers Covered by Church Plans Tell Their Stories, PENSION
RIGHTS CTR., http://www.pensionrights.org/sites/default/files/docs/workers_covered_by_church_
plans_tell_their_stories.pdf [https://perma.cc/V49U-QK8P]. 
74 Press Release, Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., In Reversal, PBGC Covers Pension of Hospital 
Center at Orange (May 10, 2013), http://www.pbgc.gov/news/press/releases/pr13-10.html 
[https://perma.cc/GBY5-5TKL]. 
75 Id.; Walsh, supra note 1. 
76 Walsh, supra note 1. 
77 Id.; Tynes v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., No. Civ.A.04-2725 (JAP), 2005 WL 1828578, at *1 
(D.N.J. Aug. 2, 2005). 
78 Tynes, 2005 WL 1828578, at *1. 
79 Id. 
80 See Press Release, Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., supra note 74. 
81 Knebel, supra note 64. 
82 See Rev. Proc. 2011-44, § 1, 2011-39 I.R.B. 446, 446. 
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applicants to provide a model notice to plan participants and beneficiaries 
that informs them of the potential ramifications of church plan status83 and 
offers them an opportunity to comment on the application.84 The IRS will 
not issue a PLR to nonelecting church plans unless these notice 
requirements are met.85 These new requirements certainly improved the 
IRS’s church plan PLR process to some extent by increasing plan 
participants’ awareness of their plan’s changing status and the 
corresponding implications. But the IRS made no other modifications to its 
PLR request approval process. It continued issuing rulings according to its 
longstanding interpretation, which recognizes the possibility that church 
plans may be established by entities affiliated with churches, not just solely 
by churches.86 By failing to further improve its PLR request approval 
process, the IRS allowed the tension surrounding its interpretation of the 
statute to percolate and created the opportunity for the church plan 
litigation discussed in Part II.  
II. LITIGATION CHALLENGING WHO CAN ESTABLISH A CHURCH PLAN
A. Wave of Litigation Leading Up to
Advocate Health Care Network v. Stapleton 
Recent years have seen a significant uptick in class action litigation 
against religiously affiliated nonprofit hospital systems that operate their 
pension plans as church plans. This litigation has cast a spotlight on the 
church plan exemption and its definition. In particular, the litigation puts 
Subsections A and C of 29 U.S.C. § 1002(33), and how they work in 
conjunction, under the microscope. Subsection A provides that “[a] ‘church 
83 See id. § 3. The model language provides answers to these questions: “Why are you receiving 
this notice?”; “Why does church plan status matter?”; “What is the effect of an election to be subject to 
ERISA?”; and “What is the scope of a letter ruling?” Id. at Appendix. 
84 See, e.g., Letter from John Matuska to Internal Revenue Service (Dec. 30, 2011) [hereinafter 
Matuska Letter], http://dl.dropbox.com/u/21179812/spuh/Matuska%20Letter%20to%20IRS.pdf [https://
perma.cc/574H-CHBV]; Letter from Bruce Pardo to Internal Revenue Service (Dec. 21, 2011) 
[hereinafter Pardo Letter], http://dl.dropbox.com/u/21179812/spuh/Pardo%20letter.pdf [https://
perma.cc/4MLM-Z76W] (letters from former St. Peter’s employees to IRS requesting IRS not to award 
church plan status to St. Peter’s). 
85 Rev. Proc. 2011-44, § 2, 2011-39 I.R.B. 446, 447. 
86 See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 84-44-065 (July 31, 1984), 1984 WL 268070; I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 
91-14-026 (Apr. 5, 1991), 1991 WL 777892; I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 1999-01-033 (Oct. 15, 1998),
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-wd/9901033.pdf [https://perma.cc/8QBP-PS86]; I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2004-
01-022 (Oct. 8, 2003), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-wd/0401022.pdf [https://perma.cc/7LRZ-QNDB];
I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2013-18-030 (Feb. 6, 2013), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-wd/1318030.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/SC8B-MKUQ].
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plan’ means a plan established and maintained . . . for its employees . . . by 
a church.”87 Subsection C clarifies that:  
A plan established and maintained for its employees . . . by a church . . . 
includes a plan maintained by an organization . . . the principal purpose or 
function of which is the administration or funding of a plan or program for the 
provision of retirement benefits or welfare benefits . . . if such organization is 
controlled by or associated with a church . . . .88  
Since 2013, more than thirty lawsuits have challenged the church plan 
status of religiously affiliated hospital systems’ pension plans.89 This Part 
examines how the courts have addressed the church plan dispute, which in 
most cases has resulted in either broad or narrow categorical outcomes that 
may well lead to arbitrary distinctions and unfair results. It also analyzes 
the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Advocate Health Care Network v. 
Stapleton, which endorsed a broad interpretation of exemption status. 
Examining the reasoning and scope of these court decisions unveils that a 
balanced, multifactor extrajudicial solution, as opposed to these bright-line 
approaches, might be a better solution to address the concerns on both sides 
of the issue. The components of this type of balanced solution are further 
fleshed out in Parts III and IV. 
Generally, plaintiffs in these cases are plan beneficiaries or 
participants seeking ERISA protections because they are concerned that 
their pension plans are underfunded.90 They generally allege that the 
hospital systems fail to meet the establishment prong of the definition of a 
church plan because the plans are not established by a church and therefore 
not entitled to the exemption.91 A common secondary argument raises 
87 29 U.S.C. § 1002(33)(A) (2012); see also 26 U.S.C. § 414(e)(1) (2012) (providing a parallel 
provision in the Tax Code). 
88 29 U.S.C. § 1002(33)(C); see also 26 U.S.C. § 414(e)(3)(A) (providing a parallel provision in the 
Tax Code). 
89 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 13–14 n.8, Advocate Health Care Network v. Stapleton, 
137 S. Ct. 546 (2016) (No. 16-74) [hereinafter Stapleton Petition for Writ of Certiorari] (listing thirty-
six cases). 
90 See, e.g., Stapleton v. Advocate Health Care Network, 76 F. Supp. 3d 796, 797 (N.D. Ill. 2014) 
(“Plaintiffs allege that by unlawfully operating the plan outside the scope of ERISA, Advocate breached 
its fiduciary duties and harmed the plan’s participants by . . . funding the plan at insufficient 
levels . . . .”), aff’d, 817 F.3d 517 (7th Cir. 2016), rev’d, No. 16-258, slip op. at 15 (U.S. June 5, 2017); 
Kaplan v. Saint Peter’s Healthcare Sys., No. 13-2941 (MAS)(TJB), 2014 WL 1284854, at *2 (D.N.J. 
Mar. 31, 2014) (“Plaintiff’s principal grievance is that [St. Peter’s] is improperly maintaining its Plan to 
the detriment of its employees . . . [and] he alleges that [St. Peter’s] is employing church-plan status to 
evade ERISA’s various requirements including underfunding the Plan by over $70 million.”), motion to 
certify appeal granted, No. 13-2941 (MAS)(TJB), 2014 WL 4678059 (D.N.J. Sept. 19, 2014), aff’d, 
810 F.3d 175 (3d Cir. 2015), rev’d sub nom. Stapleton, slip op. at 15. 
91 See, e.g., Rollins v. Dignity Health, 59 F. Supp. 3d 965, 967 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (“Rollins argues 
that . . . the Plan was established by Dignity’s predecessor, Catholic Healthcare West . . . , [which] was 
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questions around the maintenance prong of the church plan definition as to 
whether the religiously affiliated hospital systems are sufficiently 
controlled by or associated with a church to meet the “principal purpose” 
definition of Subsection C.92 The hospital systems generally contend that 
church plans can be established by hospitals if those entities are controlled 
by or associated with a church.93 As part of their defense, most defendants 
present evidence of their religious affiliations and point to PLRs they 
received from the IRS or the IRS General Counsel Memoranda, as well as 
urge the courts to take into consideration the IRS’s longstanding 
interpretation that non-churches could establish church plans. 
Federal courts across the country “have not been a beacon of 
uniformity” when “[f]aced with disputes over church-plan status” related to 
the interplay between Subsections A and C of 29 U.S.C. § 1002(33).94 The 
Third, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits affirmed district court rulings in favor of 
plaintiffs that interpreted the exemption narrowly, holding that the two 
statutory provisions dictate that the religiously affiliated hospital systems’ 
pension plans do not qualify as church plans because they were not 
established by a church.95 In contrast, other recent district court decisions 
embraced a broader interpretation,96 finding that “church plans do not have 
to be established by churches as long as the plans are properly maintained 
not a church, and that therefore the Plan is not an exempt church plan under the statute.”), motion to 
certify appeal granted, No. 13-cv-01450-TEH, 2014 WL 6693891 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 26, 2014), aff’d and 
remanded, 830 F.3d 900 (9th Cir. 2016), rev’d sub nom. Stapleton, slip op. at 15. 
92 Medina v. Catholic Health Initiatives, 147 F. Supp. 3d 1190, 1194 (D. Colo. 2015) (“Plaintiff 
argues that CHI is neither a church nor controlled by or associated with a church.”). Some plaintiffs also 
make constitutional arguments. See, e.g., id. at 1203 (making the constitutional argument that 
recognizing this particular church plan exemption violated the First Amendment’s Establishment 
Clause). 
93 Some defendants also offer constitutional arguments. See, e.g., Kaplan, 810 F.3d at 186 (arguing 
that constitutional issues under the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause may arise if the IRS is 
forced when evaluating church plan exemption requests to inquire into whether church agencies are 
serving sufficiently religious functions such that they themselves could qualify as a church). 
94 Herman, supra note 24, at 232. 
95 Stapleton, 817 F.3d at 519, 530; Rollins, 830 F.3d at 903; Kaplan, 810 F.3d at 177. 
96 See Medina, 147 F. Supp. 3d at 1193–94 (finding a plan qualifies for the exemption where it is 
“‘established and maintained’ by a church—that is, if it is maintained by an organization controlled by 
or associated with a church or convention of churches”); Lann v. Trinity Health Corp., No. PJM 14-
2237, 2015 WL 6468197, at *1 (D. Md. Feb. 24, 2015) (holding “an organization that is ‘controlled by 
or associated with a church or convention of churches’ [can] establish a ‘church plan’”); Overall v. 
Ascension, 23 F. Supp. 3d 816, 829 (E.D. Mich. 2014) (“[T]he church plan exemption includes plans 
sponsored by church-affiliated organizations, such as hospitals or schools, if these plans are 
administered by plan committees (1) whose principal function is to administer the plan, (2) if the plan 
committee is controlled by or associated with a church.”). According to Jeffrey A. Herman, at least 
eight federal courts have adopted this broader interpretation. See Herman, supra note 24, at 232 n.6. 
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by a church-affiliated organization.”97 The Tenth Circuit was poised to hear 
an appeal of one of these broad interpretation cases, but a postponement 
was granted98 after the Supreme Court granted certiorari in December 2016 
in the three narrow exemption cases from the Third, Seventh, and Ninth 
Circuits and consolidated them.99  
As this recent wave of litigation has unfolded,100 many in the 
employee benefits industry have been closely watching, with some arguing 
in support of a broad application of the exemption and others arguing it 
should be construed narrowly.101 The remainder of this Section will outline 
the relevant aspects of how the narrow application cases and broad 
application cases played out in the appellate courts to reveal the need for a 
more balanced solution between the two positions. The next Section 
analyzes the Supreme Court’s decision in Advocate Health Care Network v. 
Stapleton, which ultimately endorsed a broad application and further 
underscores the need for a balanced solution. 
The first narrow application case in this series of litigation against 
religiously affiliated hospitals to be addressed on appeal, Kaplan v. Saint 
Peter’s Healthcare System, involved a suit filed by current and former 
employees of St. Peter’s Healthcare System, which operated St. Peter’s 
University Hospital and St. Peter’s Health and Management Services 
Corporation, among other companies.102 St. Peter’s established its defined 
97 Herman, supra note 24, at 232. 
98 See Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, Medina v. Catholic Health Initiatives, No. 16-1005 (10th Cir. 
June 22, 2016); Order, Medina, No. 16-1005 (10th Cir. Dec. 13, 2016). 
99 Advocate Health Care Network v. Stapleton, 137 S. Ct. 546 (2016); Saint Peter’s Healthcare Sys. 
v. Kaplan, 137 S. Ct. 546 (2016); Dignity Health v. Rollins, 137 S. Ct. 546 (2016). 
100 One case that is at times lumped in with this recent wave of lawsuits filed against religiously
affiliated hospital systems is the 2011 class action case of Thorkelson v. Publishing House of 
Evangelical Lutheran Church in America, which involved a terminated pension plan of a nonprofit 
publishing house affiliated with a Lutheran congregation. See 764 F. Supp. 2d 1119, 1122 (D. Minn. 
2011) (dismissing plaintiffs’ ERISA claims after finding the plan is a church plan exempt from the 
provisions of ERISA). Prior to Thorkelson, litigation around the church plan definition arose in the 
context of long-term disability plans. See, e.g., Chronister v. Baptist Health, 442 F.3d 648, 651–52 (8th 
Cir. 2006) (finding a long-term disability plan was not church plan exempted from ERISA, given lack 
of denominational financing and other factors); Lown v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 238 F.3d 543, 545–46 (4th 
Cir. 2001) (finding a long-term disability plan maintained by Baptist Healthcare was not a church plan 
and was subject to ERISA). 
101 Compare Stein, supra note 28 (arguing that the ERISA church plan exemption was originally 
conceived as a narrow exemption for only church employees, not employees of church-affiliated 
agencies), with Miller, supra note 63 (rebuttal to Norman Stein explaining that allowing church-
affiliated employers to establish church plans was an intended result under the church plan definition as 
it was amended by the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980). 
102 No. 13-2941 (MAS)(TJB), 2014 WL 1284854, at *1–2 (D.N.J. Mar. 31, 2014), motion to certify 
appeal granted, No. 13-2941 (MAS)(TJB), 2014 WL 4678059 (D.N.J. Sept. 19, 2014), aff’d, 810 F.3d 
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benefit pension plan in 1974 and operated it as an ERISA plan for more 
than thirty years before reconsidering its plan’s status and seeking a church 
plan PLR in 2006.103 The district court held that St. Peter’s pension plan 
was not a church plan because the plain language of the statute requires that 
a “church plan must, from the outset, be established by a church and can be 
maintained by an organization controlled by or associated with a church.”104 
The district court declined to give deference to the PLR that St. Peter’s had 
received from the IRS.105   
On appeal of the district court ruling in Kaplan, the Third Circuit 
judges dedicated a sizeable amount of time during oral arguments to 
discussion of the IRS’s longstanding position that church-affiliated entities 
can establish church plans.106 They questioned plaintiffs’ counsel asking 
how, if they ruled in plaintiffs’ favor, such a longstanding, multi-agency 
position, which they noted was remarkable, could just be wiped away.107 
Plaintiffs’ counsel suggested the IRS interpretation should only be afforded 
deference under Skidmore v. Swift & Co.108 She argued that the PLRs, on 
their face, are not precedential and provide no statutory analysis, meaning 
they only warrant deference to the extent they have power to persuade.109 In 
its opinion, the Third Circuit agreed with plaintiffs’ counsel on the 
deference point110 and affirmed the district court’s plain text reading that a 
church plan must be established by a church.111 The court noted a “fatal 
175 (3d Cir. 2015), rev’d sub nom. Advocate Health Care Network v. Stapleton, No. 16-258, slip op. at 
15 (U.S. June 5, 2017). 
103 Kaplan, 810 F.3d at 177–78. 
104 Kaplan, 2014 WL 1284854, at *6. 
105 Id. at *9–10. The court gave three reasons for not affording deference: (1) the IRS ruling 
conflicts with the statute’s plain text, whereby giving it deference would be unreasonable, (2) the PLR 
is merely conclusory, lacks statutory analysis, and cannot be used as precedent because it was issued 
based on information supplied by St. Peter’s, and (3) precedent has provided that congressional silence 
cannot be used to turn administrative rulings into law. Id. 
106 Oral Argument at 39:30, Kaplan, 810 F.3d 175 (No. 15-1172) [hereinafter Kaplan Oral 
Argument], http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/oralargument/audio/15-1172Kaplanv.SaintPeter’s.mp3 
[https://perma.cc/J9W7-XMY4]. 
107 Id. at 39:43. 
108 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (finding “[administrative agency] rulings, interpretations and 
opinions . . . while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of 
experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance” 
dependent “upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its 
consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to 
persuade, if lacking power to control”). 
109 Kaplan Oral Argument, supra note 106, at 39:55. 
110 Kaplan, 810 F.3d 175. 
111 Id. at 177. The Third Circuit noted that after the 1980 amendment to the definition, past district 
courts had “assumed” that non-church entities with “sufficiently strong ties to churches” could establish 
church plans, noting that the only appellate decision to come to that conclusion reached it in a dictum. 
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flaw” in the statutory construction St. Peter’s advanced—that the church 
plan definition could be read to conclude that any plan maintained, even if 
not established, by a church agency is exempt.112 The court pointed out that 
St. Peter’s explicitly conceded this flaw when pressed with a hypothetical 
question in oral argument.113 The hypothetical scenario presented was: 
Congress passes a law that any person who is disabled and a veteran is entitled 
to free insurance. In the ensuing years, there is a question about whether 
people who served in the National Guard are veterans for purposes of the 
statute. To clarify, Congress passes an amendment saying that, for purposes of 
the provision, “a person who is disabled and a veteran includes a person who 
served in the National Guard.”114 
After presenting the scenario, the judge asked whether “a person who 
served in the National Guard but is not disabled qualifies to collect free 
insurance,” to which St. Peter’s counsel replied that the person did not 
qualify because “only the second of the two conditions was satisfied.”115 
This hypothetical made repeat appearances in both of the other narrow 
application cases in the Seventh and Ninth Circuits and in oral argument 
before the Supreme Court.116 Commentators also have questioned its value 
to the analysis of the church plan definition.117   
Id. at 178 (citing Lown v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 238 F.3d 543, 547 (4th Cir. 2001)). The court distinguished 
the new wave of litigation from these past cases, indicating they “presented an argument not previously 
considered by courts—that the actual words of the church plan definition preclude th[e] result.” Id. 
112 Id. at 181. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. In their Supreme Court brief, the religiously affiliated hospital defendants withdrew this 
“concession,” noting “Saint Peter’s had seconds to consider the hypothetical” and clarifying that: 
Under the hypothetical statute’s plain text, nondisabled Guardsmen are entitled to benefits. And 
that result would be unsurprising if the context were analogous to the context here: the 
government had extended benefits to non-disabled Guardsmen for over 30 years; three other 
federal statutes assumed they were eligible; there was no reason to distinguish between healthy 
and disabled Guardsmen; and such a construction comported with the hypothetical law’s history 
and purposes and was essential to avoid constitutional difficulties. 
Brief for Petitioners at 30 & n.6, Advocate Health Care Network v. Stapleton, No.16-74, slip op. (U.S. 
June 5, 2017). 
116 See Rollins v. Dignity Health, 830 F.3d 900, 906 (9th Cir. 2016) (calling it a “helpful 
illustration”); Stapleton v. Advocate Health Care Network, 817 F.3d 517, 524 (7th Cir. 2016) (calling it 
an “illuminating hypothetical”); see also Transcript of Oral Argument at 22, 25, Stapleton, slip op. 
(Justice Kagan discussing how “it’s pretty clear that you would read . . . the [hypothetical] about 
disabled veterans . . . as just going to one of the criteria” and Justice Alito asking “[w]hat is the 
significance, in practical terms, of a plan’s being established by a church” if “the requirement that the 
plan be established by the church was absolutely critical, as the requirement that the . . . individual have 
a disability is absolutely critical in the hypothetical”). 
117 See Herman, supra note 24, at 254–56. Herman argues that the “hypothetical gets completely 
wrong the relationship between the two requirements in the church plan definition” because “[t]he 
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The second narrow interpretation case heard on appeal was the 
Seventh Circuit case of Stapleton v. Advocate Health Care Network. 
Former and current employees of Advocate Health Care Network brought 
the case against the Advocate hospital system, which operates twelve 
hospitals across Illinois and employs more than 33,000 employees.118 
Advocate was formed in 1995 through the merger of two health systems, 
one associated with the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America and one 
associated with the United Church of Christ.119 The district court held 
Advocate’s pension plan failed to meet the criteria for the church plan 
exemption and found that Advocate’s contention that a plan could qualify 
for the exemption solely on the basis of being maintained by a non-church 
entity would hollow the “established by” requirement.120  
On appeal, Advocate again advanced the IRS’s longstanding 
interpretation, arguing it was “contemporaneous, thorough, [and] well-
reasoned, and [has been] consistently applied for more than 30 years.”121 
However, the Seventh Circuit adopted the statutory interpretation logic 
embraced by the Third Circuit, finding Advocate’s plan was not a church 
plan because it had not been established by a church.122 In its opinion, the 
court boiled down the language of 29 U.S.C. § 1002(33)(C) and succinctly 
summarized each side’s position: 
The statute simplified: A church plan includes a plan maintained by a church 
affiliated organization. 
Advocate’s position on what this means: A plan established and maintained by 
a church includes a plan established by a church-affiliated organization (and 
maintained by either a church or a church affiliated organization). 
difference between ‘established’ and ‘maintained’ is the same as the difference between ‘creation’ and 
‘existence’” where “[t]he first requirement is the birth of the thing, which happens at a single point in 
time, and the second requirement is how the thing continues to exist thereafter.” Id. at 255. This is in 
contrast to the separation of the requirements of being “disabled” and a “veteran,” which are “otherwise 
unrelated” and have no sequencing requirements. Id. But see Thomas E. Clark, Jr., 3rd Circuit Grants 
Victory to Participants Challenging Church Plan Status, FIDUCIARY MATTERS BLOG (Dec. 30, 2015), 
http://blog.fraplantools.com/3rd-circuit-grants-victory-to-participants-challenging-church-plan-status/ 
[https://perma.cc/5HK9-9JFT] (noting the hypothetical “clarifies the issue and is worth repeating”). 
118 817 F.3d at 520. 
119 Id. 
120 Stapleton, 76 F. Supp. 3d 796, 800–01 (N.D. Ill. 2014), aff’d, 817 F.3d at 519, rev’d, slip op. at 
15. 
121 Brief for the Appellant at 23, Stapleton, 817 F.3d 517 (No. 15-1368). 
122 Stapleton, 817 F.3d at 519–20. 
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The plaintiffs’ position: A plan established and maintained by a church also 
includes a plan established by a church but maintained by a church-affiliated 
organization.123 
While the court agreed with Advocate that the word “includes” in the 
statute was expansive in nature, it disagreed with Advocate about the extent 
of the expansion, finding the word was expansive only as to who could 
maintain a church plan, not as to who could establish a church plan.124  
The Ninth Circuit followed in the footsteps of the Third and Seventh 
Circuits when it handed down the third narrow application opinion in 
Rollins v. Dignity Health.125 Rollins involves a class action suit, brought by 
lead plaintiff Starla Rollins who worked as a billing coordinator for more 
than twenty years for a hospital under the Dignity Health umbrella, which 
includes hospitals in more than sixteen states.126 Similar to Advocate, 
Dignity Health was formed through a merger of two religiously affiliated 
health systems.127 Rollins alleged the pension plan operated by Dignity 
Health, from which she will be eligible for benefits upon retirement age, 
should not qualify for the church plan exemption under the “must be 
established by a church” reasoning.128 The district court ruled in Rollins’ 
favor based on a plain text reading of the statute as well as the legislative 
history,129 giving no deference to Dignity’s PLR from the IRS.130  
On appeal, less than two minutes into oral argument before the Ninth 
Circuit panel, Judge William Fletcher posed the Third Circuit’s 
hypothetical to Dignity Health’s counsel.131 Dignity Health’s counsel 
referred to it as the “trick hypo” and answered that “guardsman are covered 
123 Id. at 523. 
124 Id. at 524. 
125 830 F.3d 900 (9th Cir. 2016). 
126 19 F. Supp. 3d 909, 910 (N.D. Cal. 2013). 
127 The merger of two nonprofit health systems run by two different Sisters of Mercy congregations 
created Dignity Health’s predecessor, Catholic Healthcare West, in 1986. Rollins, 830 F.3d at 903. 
Initially, employees of the newly merged system received pension benefits through seven different 
plans, separately maintained either by a Sponsoring Congregation, by an individual hospital, or by the 
newly merged system. Id. But in 1989, the seven plans were rolled into one plan, and three years later, 
the Board of Directors adopted a retroactive resolution to treat that plan as a church plan. Id. 
128 Rollins, 19 F. Supp. 3d. at 912. 
129 Id. at 917. 
130 Id. at 912–13 (“[A] written determination may not be used or cited as precedent.” (citation 
omitted)). 
131 Oral Argument at 1:40, Rollins, 830 F.3d 900 (No. 15-15351), http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/
media/view.php?pk_id=0000015360 [https://perma.cc/ETJ5-W877]. 
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without regard to disability.”132 Judge Fletcher challenged this reading, 
calling it “nonsensical.”133 Dignity Health’s counsel’s response was that 
their opinions differed as to which words in both the hypothetical and the 
actual church plan definition statute were doing the work, arguing that 
“veteran” and “maintenance” are doing the work in the hypothetical and 
statute, respectively, not “disability” and “establish.”134 Dignity Health 
urged the court to take account of the well-settled IRS interpretation and to 
consider the implications of overturning it.135 However, like the Third and 
Seventh Circuits before it, the Ninth Circuit was not swayed by Dignity 
Health’s arguments. In his opinion, Judge Fletcher utilized the Third 
Circuit hypothetical in his analysis of the statutory text, finding it 
“reasonably clear from context” that an individual “who served in the 
National Guard satisfies the requirement that he or she be a veteran, but 
that this person qualifies for free insurance only if he or she is also 
disabled.”136 Similarly, the opinion stated that context made it reasonably 
clear that “a plan maintained by a principal-purpose organization satisfies 
the requirement that it be maintained by a church, but that the plan qualifies 
as a church plan only if it was also established by a church.”137 Again, the 
IRS’s longstanding interpretation as outlined in the 1982 General Counsel 
Memorandum proved unpersuasive to the court under Skidmore.138  
In contrast to these narrow application decisions, some district courts 
have agreed with defendants’ contentions that church plans can be 
established by church-affiliated organizations, not just churches. These 
broader applications are akin to the IRS’s longstanding interpretation that 
recognizes non-churches can establish a church plan, provided they are 
sufficiently controlled by the church. The reasoning of these broader 
interpretations has not yet been tested at the appellate level in this litigation 
series. An appeal of Medina v. Catholic Health Initiatives was progressing 
in the Tenth Circuit, but has since been postponed pending the Supreme 
132 Id. at 2:28. In their briefing before the Supreme Court, the religiously affiliated hospital 
defendants maintained this response to the hypothetical and clarified the answer given during the oral 
arguments in the Third Circuit. See supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
133 Id. at 2:33. 
134 Id. at 2:35. 
135 Id. at 5:20 (“[I]t defies . . . common sense and all sense of deference that three agencies in a 
statute like this with so much complexity and interrelationship with other statutes, were just asleep at 
the switch and missed the boat for thirty-two years, and erroneously issued 500 determinations, each of 
which had massive financial, legal, and religious consequences.”). 
136 Rollins, 830 F.3d at 906, cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 546 (2016). 
137 Id. 
138 Id. at 910. 
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Court proceedings.139 Medina involved a class action suit filed against 
Catholic Health Initiatives and the members of its Board of Stewardship 
Trustees and Human Resources Committee by a former employee on 
behalf of similarly situated individuals.140 Like Advocate and Dignity 
Health, Catholic Health Initiatives was also formed through a consolidation 
of multiple Catholic health systems.141 Its ties to the Roman Catholic 
Church run deep, with Catholic Health Initiatives serving as the civil law 
counterpart for operational purposes to the canon law entity, which must 
have Vatican approval.142  
In Medina, the district court granted summary judgment to the 
defendants, holding that a plan may constitute a church plan in two ways: 
the “must be established by a church” route in 29 U.S.C. § 1002(33)(A) 
and an alternative route through 29 U.S.C. § 1002(33)(C).143 This 
alternative creation of a church plan occurs where it is maintained by an 
organization meeting two criteria:  
(1) the principal purpose or function of the organization is the administration
or funding of a plan or program for the provision of retirement benefits or
welfare benefits, or both, for the employees of a church or a convention or
association of churches; and (2) the organization is controlled by or associated
with a church or a convention or association of churches.144
Furthermore, while the court was not forced to reach the question of 
whether Catholic Health Initiatives was a church for purposes of the “must 
be established by a church” route in Subsection A, the order seemed to 
suggest it contemplated that question, finding it “ha[d] little trouble in 
concluding that [Catholic Health Initiatives] is, at the very least, a 
constituent part of the Catholic Church.”145  
In two other cases that demonstrate the broader application of the 
church plan exemption, the district courts similarly followed the Medina 
conclusion at the motion-to-dismiss stage. In Lann v. Trinity Health Corp., 
the district court held that an organization that is controlled or associated 
with a church is permitted to establish a church plan.146 In Overall v. 
Ascension, the district court ruled that church plans need not be established 
139 See Order, Medina v. Catholic Health Initiatives, No. 16-1005 (10th Cir. Dec. 13, 2016). 
140 Medina v. Catholic Health Initiatives, 147 F. Supp. 3d 1190, 1192–93 (D. Colo. 2015). 
141 Id. at 1196. 
142 See id. at 1196–97. 
143 Id. at 1192–94. 
144 Id. at 1194 (citation omitted). 
145 Id. at 1199 (providing ample discussion of the structure and history of Catholic Health 
Initiatives and its intertwining connection with the Roman Catholic Church). 
146 No. PJM 14-2237, 2015 WL 6468197, at *1 (D. Md. Feb. 24, 2015). 
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by a church where they are “sponsored by church-affiliated organizations, 
such as hospitals or schools, if these plans are administered by plan 
committees (1) whose principal function is to administer the plan, [and] (2) 
if the plan committee is controlled by or associated with a church.”147 The 
court concluded that Ascension’s plans qualified as church plans due to the 
hospital’s control and association with the Roman Catholic Church.148 
The parties in both Overall and Lann ultimately reached settlement 
agreements. Before much progress was made in the Sixth Circuit appellate 
proceedings in Overall, Ascension agreed to adopt certain ERISA-like 
protections and infuse its plans with a one-time $8 million payment to 
assure benefits through 2022 in exchange for continued church plan 
exemption status.149 Similarly, in the Lann case,150 Trinity Health agreed to 
adopt certain ERISA-like protections for the next fifteen years and infuse 
its church plans with $75 million over three years.151 
With the Stapleton and Rollins decisions providing the second and 
third appellate wins for church plan-status challengers, the litigation series 
launched into overdrive. One report estimated that almost two dozen 
additional class action suits were filed since March 2016,152 and litigants 
147 23 F. Supp. 3d 816, 829 (E.D. Mich. 2014). 
148 Id. at 829–33. 
149 Order and Final Judgment, Overall v. Ascension Health, No. 13-cv-11396-AC-LJM (E.D. Mich. 
Sept. 17, 2015) (order approving class action settlement); see also Samantha Liss, Ascension Pension 
Settlement Highlights Vulnerability of ‘Church Plans,’ ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Aug. 7, 2015), 
http://www.stltoday.com/business/local/ascension-pension-settlement-highlights-vulnerability-of-
church-plans/article_3beaf4c0-375e-58e8-a1b4-a02cfd68dfec.html [https://perma.cc/YQ7H-PZQD]. 
150 Lann was consolidated with another church plan case, Chavies v. Catholic Health East, due to a 
July 2014 merger of Catholic Health East with Trinity Health Corporation, which brought the church 
plans at issue in both cases under the same Trinity umbrella. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’ 
Motion for Preliminary Approval of the Class Action Settlement Agreement at 3, 5, Lann v. Trinity 
Health Corp., No. 14-cv-2237 (PJM) (D. Md. Aug. 1, 2016). 
151 Id. at 5–6. 
152 Knebel, supra note 64 (“Since March, nearly two dozen lawsuits have targeted major hospital 
systems taking this approach.”); see, e.g., Complaint, Allen v. Iowa Health Sys. d/b/a Unitypoint 
Health, No. 1:16-cv-01132 (C.D. Ill. Apr. 29, 2016); Class Action Complaint, Jewett v. Franciscan All., 
Inc., No. 1:16-cv-04589 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 22, 2016); Complaint, Nicholson v. Franciscan Missionaries of 
Our Lady Health Sys., No. 3:16-cv-00258 (M.D. La. Apr. 21, 2016); Class Action Complaint, Miller v. 
Bon Secours Health Sys., Inc., No. 1:16-cv-01150 (D. Md. Apr. 18, 2016); Class Action Complaint, 
Hodges v. Bon Secours Health Sys., Inc., No. 1:16-cv-01079 (D. Md. Apr. 11, 2016); Complaint, Curtis 
v. Wheaton Franciscan, No. 1:16-cv-04232 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 11, 2016); Class Action Complaint, Feather
v. SSM Health, No. 3:16-cv-00393 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 8, 2016); Complaint, Beiermann v. SSM Health Care
Corp., No. 4:16-cv-00460 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 4, 2016); Complaint, Lupp v. Mercy Health, No. 16-00441
(S.D. Ohio Mar. 30, 2016); Complaint, Boden v. St. Elizabeth Med. Ctr., Inc., No. 2:16-cv-00049 (E.D.
Ky. Mar. 17, 2016). The challenges to church plan status have also expanded beyond the category of
religiously affiliated hospital systems. See, e.g., Complaint, Martinez-Gonzalez v. Catholic Sch. of the
Archdioceses of San Juan Pension Plan, No. 3:16-cv-02077 (D.P.R. June 13, 2016) (school employees
challenging church plan status of Catholic school system in Puerto Rico).
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increasingly began exploring settlement options.153 Even without a clear-cut 
circuit split, the hospitals in Advocate, Kaplan, and Rollins argued Supreme 
Court review of the church plan dispute was warranted because of the 
“explosion of litigation of this magnitude in such an important and 
recurring area of ERISA, where national uniformity is paramount” and the 
possibility of “billions of dollars in retroactive liability and a wholesale 
upheaval in the administration of pension plans affecting religious 
employers and employees across the country.”154 The first indication of the 
Court’s interest in the dispute came in September 2016 when Justice 
Anthony Kennedy granted a stay of the Ninth Circuit decision.155 This was 
followed in December 2016, when the Court granted certiorari in the three 
cases.156 The Court heard oral arguments in March 2017 and handed down 
their decision in Advocate Health Care Network v. Stapleton in June, which 
is analyzed in the next Section. 
B. The Supreme Court Endorses a Broad Interpretation of the Church
Plan Exemption in Advocate Health Care Network v. Stapleton
On June 5, 2017, the Supreme Court sided with the religiously 
affiliated hospitals in Advocate Health Care Network v. Stapleton, 
reinforcing the status quo and reversing the judgments of the Third, 
Seventh, and Ninth Circuits.157 Justice Elena Kagan authored the 8–0 
opinion, with Justice Sonia Sotomayor filing a concurring opinion and 
Justice Neil Gorsuch taking no part in consideration of the cases or the 
decision.  
153 See, e.g., Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Unopposed Motion for Preliminary 
Approval of Class Action Settlement at 1, Kemp-DeLisser v. St. Francis Hosp. & Med. Ctr., No. 3:15-
cv-01113 (D. Conn. May 20, 2016) (St. Francis Hospital agreeing to a $107 million settlement
agreement spread over ten years but making no promise of additional ERISA-like provisions);
Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Unopposed Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class
Action Settlement at 7, 12–13, Tucker v. Baptist Health Sys., Inc., No. 2:15-cv-00382-SLB (N.D. Ala.
Aug. 26, 2016) (Baptist Health agreeing to contribute $11 million to its church plan over ten years after
already infusing it with $88.9 million pre-settlement and agreeing not to terminate the plan unless it has
sufficient assets to cover liabilities for eight years post-termination). 
154 Stapleton Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 89, at 15; Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 
15, Saint Peter’s Healthcare Sys. v. Kaplan, 137 S. Ct. 546 (2016) (No. 16-86); Rollins Petition for Writ 
of Certiorari, supra note 64, at 15–16. 
155 Dignity Health v. Rollins, 137 S. Ct. 28 (2016). 
156 Advocate Health Care Network v. Stapleton, 137 S. Ct. 546 (2016); Kaplan, 137 S. Ct. 546; 
Rollins, 137 S. Ct. 546. 
157 Advocate Health Care Network v. Stapleton, No.16-74, slip op. at 6 (U.S. June 5, 2017) (“T]he 
parties differ as to whether a plan maintained by [a principal purpose] organization must still have been 
established by a church to qualify for the church-plan exemption. The hospitals say no. . . . The 
employees say yes. . . . We conclude that the hospitals have the better of the argument.”). 
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The Supreme Court held that based on the text of the statutory 
language, a “plan maintained by a principal-purpose organization therefore 
qualifies as a ‘church plan,’ regardless of who established it.”158 Justice 
Kagan explained that the use of the word “includes” in the exemption 
definition is not literal and rather signals to readers of the statute that a 
“different type of plan should receive the same treatment (i.e., an 
exemption) as the type described in the old definition.”159 Justice Kagan 
leaned on the simplified analysis offered by the Overall court: “as one 
court put the point without any of the ERISA terminology: ‘[I]f A is 
exempt, and A includes C, then C is exempt.’ Just so.”160 The Court also 
noted other statutory interpretation tools supported its conclusion, including 
the surplusage canon and the notion that when legislators do not adopt 
“obvious alternative” language, the “natural implication” is that the 
alternative was not intended.161 As for legislative history, the Court gave 
little weight to the “bits and pieces” and “scattered floor statements of 
individual lawmakers,” but did find that what little there was pointed in the 
direction of finding that plans maintained by the religiously affiliated 
hospitals were eligible church plans, no matter what entity established 
them.162  
The Third Circuit’s disabled veterans hypothetical163 had a farewell 
appearance in the opinion.164 The Court identified two features of the 
hypothetical that it found enhanced its persuasiveness: first, the criteria 
used (veteran status and disability) were relatively distinct and designed to 
have stand-alone relevance; and second, the hypothetical “trades on our 
background understanding that a given interpretation is simply 
158 Id. at 15. 
159 Id. at 6–7. 
160 Id. at 7 (quoting Overall v. Ascension, 23 F. Supp. 3d 816, 828 (E.D. Mich. 2014)). 
161 Id. at 8–9 (quoting Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 134 S. Ct. 1224, 1235 (2014)). 
162 Id. at 12 (noting “everything we can tell from extra-statutory sources about Congress’s 
purpose . . . supports our reading,” while making clear that “everything we can tell” was meager at 
best). 
163 See supra notes 113–17, 131–37 and accompanying text. 
164 While the Supreme Court described the Third Circuit hypothetical as “thought-provoking,” it 
declined to embrace the plaintiffs’ proposed rule of construction, noting “one good example does not a 
general rule make.” Stapleton, slip op. at 9. Instead, the Court offered its own variant to counter the 
Third Circuit hypothetical: 
A statute offers free insurance to a “person who enlisted and served in the active Armed 
Forces,” with a later amendment providing that “a person who enlisted and served in the active 
Armed Forces includes a person who served in the National Guard.” Would a person who 
served in the National Guard be ineligible for benefits unless she had also enlisted in the active 
Armed Forces—say, the regular Army or Navy? Of course not. 
Id. at 9–10 (footnote omitted). 
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implausible . . . and could not possibly have been what Congress 
wanted.”165 However, in contrast, the Court pointed out the church plan 
exemption presents neither of these features.166 Instead, the Court noted 
there is a sequencing aspect to the establishment and maintenance criteria, 
with one serving as a precondition to the other, such that an amendment 
altering one naturally alters the other.167 Further, the Court explained that 
unlike disability in the Third Circuit’s hypothetical, which was a critical 
component of the imagined statutory scheme, the establishment condition 
is a one-time event with little functional significance.168 Removing the 
establishment condition does not present the contextual implausibility on 
which the Third Circuit’s hypothetical relied so heavily.169 Lastly, while the 
Supreme Court ultimately never had to reach the issue of whether the IRS 
PLRs and other administrative guidance on church plans deserved any 
deference, Justice Kagan did reserve a few words in her opinion for their 
discussion. She acknowledged that “[t]he three federal agencies responsible 
for administering ERISA have long read those provisions, when taken 
together, to exempt plans like the hospitals’ from the statute’s mandates” 
and that the IRS’s interpretation from the General Counsel memorandum 
has been disseminated in “hundreds of private letter rulings and opinion 
letters issued since 1982, including several provided to the hospitals” 
before the Court.170 
Justice Sotomayor joined the majority opinion because she agreed the 
statutory text compelled that conclusion, but filed a separate concurrence to 
express why the outcome still troubled her. Justice Sotomayor pointed to 
two areas she found unsettling: the silence of the legislative history on the 
question before the Court,171 and glaring differences between the church 
plans of 1980 and the church plans before the Court in 2017.172 However, 
while she noted “[t]hese organizations . . . bear little resemblance to those 
165 Id. at 10–11. 
166 Id. at 11. 
167 Id. 
168 Id. at 11–12. 
169 Id. at 12. 
170 Id. at 4. 
171 Id. at 2 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“[T]he available legislative history does not clearly endorse 
this result. That silence gives me pause: The decision to exempt plans neither established nor 
maintained by a church could have the kind of broad effect that is usually thoroughly debated during the 
legislative process and thus recorded in the legislative record.”). 
172 Id. at 2–3 (noting that “it is not at all clear that Congress would take the same action today with 
respect to some of the largest health-care providers in the country” who despite their religious 
affiliations “operate for-profit subsidiaries,” “employ thousands of employees,” “earn billions of dollars 
in revenue,” and “compete in the secular market with companies that must bear the cost of complying 
with ERISA” (citations omitted)). 
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Congress considered when enacting the 1980 amendment to the church 
plan definition,” any shift based on this evolution was not in the 
wheelhouse of the judiciary.173 Instead, she suggested that perhaps the 
“current reality might prompt Congress to take a different path.”174 
The previous two Sections discussed how courts, including the 
Supreme Court most recently, have reached either narrow or broad 
conclusions on the church plan dispute and how some cases have ended up 
in varying types of settlement arrangements. This lays the foundation for 
this Note’s prescriptive claim because it demonstrates that balanced 
solutions achieved on a case-by-case basis, such as the settlement 
agreements, may be better outcomes than categorically narrow or broad 
solutions. The next Section discusses alternative solutions to achieve this 
balance and utilize case-by-case analysis. 
III. INDIVIDUAL CASE-BY-CASE ANALYSIS OF CHURCH PLANS IS A
BETTER FIT THAN A BRIGHT-LINE RULE 
While the Supreme Court ultimately endorsed a broad scope for the 
church plan exemption in Advocate Health Care Network v. Stapleton, it is 
important to discuss other possible approaches for resolution outside the 
judicial branch to fully address the concerns of both sides. Due to the 
constraints of statutory interpretation, the courts alone cannot achieve this 
more balanced approach. This point was underscored by Justice Sotomayor 
in her concurrence in Advocate Health Care Network v. Stapleton.175 
The church plan dispute is best understood on a continuum. 
Opponents on either end of the continuum may argue the best approach 
would be a congressional act that enshrines either a very narrow 
interpretation (potentially eliminating the exemption altogether)176 or a very 
broad interpretation of what a church plan can be. The former would likely 
allow establishment of church plans by churches in the brick-and-mortar 
173 Id. at 3. 
174 Id. 
175 Id. (suggesting that a legislative solution may be a better fit but ultimately agreeing “with the 
majority that the statutory text compels [the majority’s] result”). 
176 If the basis for eliminating the church plan exemption altogether is that all pension plan 
participants deserve ERISA protections, this premise would likely require the elimination of the 
governmental plan exemption as well, because government pension plans are similarly exempt from 
ERISA and public employees covered under those plans would similarly deserve the protections of 
ERISA. Furthermore, plaintiffs do not appear to be advocating strongly for a total elimination theory. 
For example, in the Stapleton oral arguments before the Seventh Circuit, plaintiffs’ counsel referred to 
“true church plans” such as the Evangelical Church of American church plan for priests and the 
Episcopal Church in the United States of America church plan for priests. Stapleton Oral Argument, 
supra note 15, at 22:12. 
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sense only, which would greatly diminish the use of the church plan 
exemption. It could also disproportionately affect congregationally 
structured church systems (e.g., Baptist denominations), which often rely 
on associated organizations outside the church hierarchy, as compared to 
hierarchically structured church systems (e.g., Catholic denominations), 
where everything flows from the church at the top of the hierarchy down.177 
The latter may permit establishment of church plans by entities with only 
very attenuated connections to religious entities.178 By drawing bright-line 
rules, both of these categorical approaches in fact result in arbitrary 
distinctions and unfair results. Lumping together all religiously affiliated 
entities, including hospitals, schools, nursing homes, publishing houses, 
and the myriad others, as able to or not able to establish a church plan fails 
to appreciate the unique circumstances of the entity and why it seeks 
church plan status. The following Sections explain why the church plan 
exemption is worth revisiting and outlines the importance of case-by-case 
analysis of church plans. Part IV then identifies how Congress can achieve 
the desired balance for the church plan exemption. 
A. Why Revisiting the Church Plan Exemption Is Important
Having Congress revisit the church plan exemption is important for a 
few reasons. First, the roots of the church plan exemption demonstrate that 
Congress intended to prevent government entanglement with religion.179 
For constitutional and other purposes, the government often handles 
religion delicately in certain arenas, such as public health and taxes. We 
should not chip away at something Congress intended if it can be improved 
through reform. Second, religiously affiliated organizations make up a 
large segment of the U.S. economy and many act in good faith in 
177 See, e.g., Jaclyn Wille, As Church Plan Debate Hits Next Level, 3rd Cir. Receives Competing 
Amicus Briefs, BLOOMBERG BNA: PENSION & BENEFITS REP. (May 19, 2015), 
http://www.pensionrights.org/sites/default/files/docs/news/150519_bna_pension_benefits_reporter_-
_church_plan_debate_hits_next_level_-_prc_and_k1_mentioned.pdf [https://perma.cc/5GE2-MQ2M] 
(discussing how a narrow interpretation “would impermissibly favor hierarchical church governments 
over congregational ones” even though “the history of ERISA’s church plan exemption makes clear that 
Congress intended to accommodate both churches that are organized hierarchically, or ‘top-to-bottom,’ 
and those organized congregationally, such as through ‘voluntary cooperation and association’”); cf. 
Brief for Becket Fund for Religious Liberty as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 9–10, Advocate 
Health Care Network v. Stapleton, 137 S. Ct. 547 (2016) (No. 16-74) [hereinafter Becket Fund Amicus] 
(“Under the lower courts’ narrow interpretation . . . both hierarchical and congregational churches 
would face the choice Congress sought to remove: change their church organizational structure or 
imperil the ability of their agencies to offer retirement benefits.”). 
178 See, e.g., Brief for Pension Rights Center as Amicus Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-Appellee and 
Affirmance, Advocate Healthcare Network v. Stapleton, 817 F.3d 517 (3d Cir. 2015) (No. 15-1368), 
rev’d, No. 16-258, slip op. at 15 (U.S. June 5, 2017). 
179 See supra Section I.A. 
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maintaining their obligations to their employees, such as the good faith 
church plan operators who operated their plans for decades in reliance on 
the IRS’s longstanding interpretation.180 Third, there are potential ripple 
effects that the categorical solutions do not contemplate. For example, there 
could be unexpected effects on retirement plan investments in private 
equity, where private equity funds may rely on church plan investments to 
count as non-ERISA assets to avoid onerous requirements.181 In addition, 
many church plans make “moral” investment choices with their pension 
dollars that align with their religious faiths, which could be upset by 
ERISA’s investment diversification requirements.182 Reforming the church 
plan exemption legislatively would ensure these types of consequences that 
are often overlooked by courts are given meaningful consideration. For 
these reasons, a legislative solution built on case-by-case analysis of 
specific factors of church plan applicants should be explored. The next 
Section explores these case-specific factors, and then Part IV explores what 
this balanced approach might look like. 
B. Why Case-by-Case Analysis of Church Plans Is Important
The importance of case-by-case analysis is illustrated by delving into
the individual characteristics of some of the entities involved in the recent 
litigation, including how their plans have been operated historically, the 
funding levels of the plans, and the types of religious connections the 
entities have. For example, St. Peter’s, the defendant in Kaplan, previously 
operated its pension plan as an ERISA plan for more than thirty years and 
180 For example, the Stapleton petition for certiorari notes that this dispute implicates hundreds, if 
not thousands, of religious employers that employ millions of employees. Stapleton Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari, supra note 89, at 2. Removing the church plan exemption as an option for these employers 
would have potentially forced renegotiation of many union contracts, required a redesign of benefit plan 
structures to come into ERISA compliance, and required changes to pension funding methods and 
budgets to account for paying annual PBGC premiums. Id. at 3. Furthermore, an amici warned this 
could also have created pressure on churches to make changes to their organizational structure. See 
Becket Fund Amicus, supra note 177, at 8–10. 
181 In private equity, onerous ERISA fiduciary and other requirements apply to a private equity 
fund when the fund has substantial benefit plan investors. JACK S. LEVIN & DONALD E. ROCAP, 
STRUCTURING VENTURE CAPITAL, PRIVATE EQUITY, AND ENTREPRENEURIAL TRANSACTIONS 10–42 
(Martin D. Ginsburg & Russell S. Light eds., 2014). A private equity fund is not treated as holding 
ERISA plan assets under the DOL rules if it has less than 25% benefit plan investors. Id. Church plan 
assets are not considered benefit plan investors for these purposes. See Joseph K. Urwitz, What Private 
Equity Funds Should Know About ERISA, FOCUS ON PRIV. EQUITY (McDermott Will & Emery), July 
2015, at 3, https://www.mwe.com/en/thought-leadership/newsletters/2015/07/focus-on-private-equity-
july-2015 [https://perma.cc/Q45N-5TP5]. 
182 Becket Fund Amicus, supra note 177, at 11 (“[A]pplying ERISA’s diversification requirements 
to church plans might prevent religious groups from investments that, in the religion’s view, would 
promote social justice or avoid supporting evils.”). 
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sought a church plan PLR after reconsidering its plan’s status in 2006.183 In 
oral arguments, when questioned about why St. Peter’s treated its plan as 
an ERISA plan for such a long period before seeking church plan status, St. 
Peter’s counsel indicated the entity was uninformed and had not realized it 
could operate a church plan until it received better advice.184 When St. 
Peter’s sought church plan status from the IRS, some former employees, 
including John Matuska, the former CFO, COO, and CEO and a former 
longstanding member of the St. Peter’s Retirement Plan Committee, and 
Bruce Pardo, the former Vice President of Human Resources, voiced their 
opposition to the change in status.185 
While the church plan status of St. Peter’s plan was relatively recent, 
Advocate, the defendant in Stapleton, and its predecessors have long been 
operating their pension plans as church plans. Advocate was formed in 
1995 from the merger of two health systems: Lutheran General 
HealthSystem and Evangelical Health Systems.186 A predecessor of 
Evangelical Health Systems established its defined benefit pension plan in 
January 1973 and received an IRS PLR in March 1991 affirming its church 
plan status.187 Lutheran General HealthSystem also maintained a pension 
plan. Following the merger, Advocate received an IRS PLR in November 
1998, finding that the Lutheran General HealthSystem Plan was also a 
church plan.188 The two plans were then merged into one.189 A balanced 
multifactor approach could take into account nuances such as how a plan 
has been historically operated. The fact that St. Peter’s long operated its 
plan as an ERISA plan and Advocate had long operated its plans as church 
plans could be taken into consideration in awarding them church plan status 
and weighed against the other relevant factors. 
Funding of the plans is also an important factor in this inquiry, 
particularly because this aspect is a significant concern for church plan 
participants who seek confirmation that their pension dollars will be 
available when they retire. Furthermore, ensuring retirement security was a 
183 Kaplan v. Saint Peter’s Healthcare Sys., 810 F.3d 175, 177–78 (3d Cir. 2015). The plan at issue 
in the case was established in 1974 and was operated as an ERISA plan until St. Peter’s applied for a 
PLR in 2006. Id. St. Peter’s continued paying PBGC premiums as required by ERISA during the IRS 
application stage until it received a PLR in 2013. Id. 
184 Kaplan Oral Argument, supra note 106, at 15:35. 
185 See Matuska Letter, supra note 84; Pardo Letter, supra note 84. 
186 Brief and Short Appendix of Defendants-Appellants at 14, Stapleton v. Advocate Health Care 
Network, 817 F.3d 517 (7th Cir. 2016) (No. 15-1368) [hereinafter Stapleton Brief and Short Appendix 
of Defendants-Appellants]. 
187 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 91-22-078 (May 31, 1991), 1991 WL 778797. 
188 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 1999-04-041 (Jan. 29, 1999), 1999 WL 36831. 
189 Stapleton Brief and Short Appendix of Defendants-Appellants, supra note 186, at 14. 
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primary driver for the enactment of ERISA and drove the creation of the 
PBGC.190 When creating ERISA, Congress offered the church plan 
exemption to prevent entanglement with church business, not to give 
church plans license to break pension promises. Reported funding levels of 
the plans involved in the litigation vary across the cases and exact downfall 
calculations are often in dispute. For example, Dignity Health reports its 
plan is “healthy” and exceeds ERISA’s 80% funding ratio, noting as of 
September 2012 the plan held over $3.1 billion in assets, which was 
sufficient to cover 85% of projected benefit obligations and 88% of 
accumulated benefit obligations.191 On the other side of that litigation, 
however, the complaint alleged the plan was underfunded by more than 
$1.2 billion.192 These disputed funding levels illustrate how important the 
issue is to both sides, and why funding must be some part of a middle 
ground approach. Furthermore, the Hospital at Orange situation, where the 
pension fund nearly ran out of funds to pay benefits until the IRS and 
PBGC came to the rescue and agreed to reverse course to allow for PBGC 
protection reinstatement, also underscores how critical it is to reach some 
sort of agreement on the funding issues.193  
Religious ties are also an important inquiry for the case-by-case 
analysis because they are relevant as to why the church plan exemption 
exists in the first place. Because of Advocate’s formation through the 
merging of two entities from different religious faiths, both the Evangelical 
Lutheran Church in America and the United Church of Christ include 
Advocate in their annual yearbooks, which serve as directories of the 
churches.194 In addition, Advocate has contractual relationships referred to 
as “Covenantal Agreements” with branches of both denominations in 
which they “affirm their ministry in health care and the covenantal 
relationship they share with one another.”195 However, the district court 
noted that neither church owns or financially supports Advocate.196 The 
strength of religious ties and whether the denomination provides financial 
backing should be relevant factors to consider. For example, more scrutiny 
will need to be given to an entity that has gone through multiple rounds of 
190 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001(a), 1302(a) (2012). 
191 Rollins Reply Brief of Defendants-Appellants, supra note 64, at 8. 
192 Class Action Complaint at 5–6, Rollins v. Dignity Health, 59 F. Supp. 3d 965 (N.D. Cal. 2016) 
(No. 13-1450). 
193 See supra notes 73–80 and accompanying text. 
194 Stapleton Brief and Short Appendix of Defendants-Appellants, supra note 186, at 15. 
195 Id. at 15 (citation omitted). 
196 Stapleton v. Advocate Health Care Network, 76 F. Supp. 3d 796, 797 (N.D. Ill. 2014), aff’d, 
817 F.3d 517 (7th Cir. 2016), rev’d, No. 16-258, slip op. at 15 (U.S. June 5, 2017). 
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mergers and is now affiliated with, for example, five different 
denominations and where those religious denominations provide no 
financial backing to the entity.  
In the Medina case, the opinion went into great detail describing how 
intertwined Catholic Health Initiatives is with the Roman Catholic 
Church.197 It included a laundry list of connections, including the process 
by which the Vatican approves a canon law entity198 which does not have 
the ability to act or own property in the United States and thus requires the 
existence of a “civil law counterpart”—in this case Catholic Health 
Initiatives.199 Catholic Health Initiatives’ governing body consists of at least 
nine of the same individuals who are members of the canon law entity.200 
Like Advocate, Catholic Health Initiatives was formed through the 
consolidation of three health care systems that represented ten 
congregations of Catholic sisters, and is listed in the Catholic Church’s 
“official” directory of Roman Catholic institutions.201 Its Articles of 
Incorporation require its operation be “exclusively in furtherance of these 
[religious] purposes and in conformity with the ethical and moral teachings 
of the Roman Catholic Church and the Ethical and Religious Directives for 
Catholic Health Care Services.”202 So, these types of religious ties should 
weigh in favor of church plan status.   
The narrow and broad outcomes discussed previously box all 
religiously affiliated entities seeking church plan status into one category 
without taking into consideration the individual circumstances of each case. 
The courts are not equipped to provide this type of case-by-case multifactor 
analysis of church plans. Therefore, instead Part IV argues that Congress 
should seek a multifactor approach that will balance the needs of church 
plan sponsors acting in good faith with the concerns of church plan 
participants in terms of plan funding status and other ERISA-like 
protections. The church plan exemption does provide common sense 
political and economic merits worth revisiting to achieve a more balanced 
approach.   
197 Medina v. Catholic Health Initiatives, 147 F. Supp. 3d 1190, 1192−96 (D. Colo. 2015). 
198 These canon law entities are called “[p]ublic juridic persons,” which are the “official 
constitutive parts of the Catholic Church and the primary means through which the Church acts in the 
world.” Id. at 1195. 
199 Id. at 1196. 
200 Id. 
201 Id. at 1196–97. 
202 Id. at 1197. 
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IV. PROPOSAL FOR IMPLEMENTING A BALANCED APPROACH
TO CHURCH PLAN DETERMINATION 
A more robust church plan-determination process is necessary to 
balance the needs of church plan sponsors acting in good faith with the 
concerns of church plan participants in terms of plan funding status and 
other ERISA-like protections. A multifactor balancing approach will help 
serve as a gatekeeper to prevent those plans acting in bad faith (e.g., 
entities with very attenuated religious connections looking to skirt ERISA 
compliance) from obtaining church plan status, while protecting those 
religious entities that may simply not have realized their eligibility for 
church plan status. This Part first addresses procedural problems with the 
IRS’s existing church plan approval process that will require changes for a 
balanced approach to succeed. Following that, it explores which evaluative 
criteria are most critical to this new robust evaluation of church plans. 
Lastly, this Part argues that Congress should amend the statutory church 
plan exemption to implement this robust determination process.  
A. Process Improvements
For a balanced approach to be successful, changes to the existing 
process are essential. First and foremost, the government approval process 
would need to be changed from optional to required. Currently, church 
plans have the option to seek a PLR. Even though most do, this lax 
standard creates room for ambiguity and opportunities for misbehavior. 
While the new notice requirements for plan participants and beneficiaries 
implemented in the church plan PLR process after the end of the 
moratorium did increase transparency of church plan status to some extent, 
only plan participants and beneficiaries are notified. The IRS does post 
church plan PLRs for public viewing, but it redacts the identity of the entity 
seeking church plan status.203 Having either the IRS, or alternatively some 
other federal agency, affirmatively approving or denying all church plan 
applicants and further enhancing the transparency of this process would 
increase how visible church plans are to the public and prevent fewer “bad 
apple” church plans from going undetected until it is too late. Second, 
because the balanced approach requires a deeper and more holistic review 
of the church plan applicants, the level of authority of federal agency 
personnel evaluating the applications will likely need to be elevated from 
the current staff attorney level.204 The team reviewing the applications may 
also need to be expanded to include individuals with actuarial or other 
203 See supra Section I.B. 
204 See supra Section I.B. 
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technical expertise for purposes of evaluating plan funding levels. Third, 
government involvement should not only be required at the church plan 
initial request stage, but also throughout the duration of the plan’s life. One 
way to accomplish increased oversight is to limit the length of church plan 
status. For example, the church plans could be required to either reapply or 
undergo a renewal process after a five-year period to ensure the church 
plan is meeting its representations around funding, and still sufficiently 
connected to a church. 
While church plans may argue this level of oversight goes too far and 
cuts against the whole purpose of the exemption, which was to prevent 
government entanglement in church business, it is far less oversight than 
what is required under ERISA.205 Advocate Health Care Network v. 
Stapleton does not mark the end of all church plan litigation. The issue of 
whether the religiously affiliated hospitals were sufficiently associated with 
churches to meet the principle purpose requirements was not before the 
Court, and the Justices expressed no opinion on how those types of issues 
should be resolved.206 Furthermore, because church plans are not shielded 
by ERISA preemption, they could be subject to state law claims, including 
breach of contract, negligence, and statutory claims.207 One employee 
benefits lawyer speculated that “states could enact legislation that could 
permit participants in church plans to bring suit based on nonpayment or 
underfunding.”208 Moving toward a balanced approach that provides a 
moderate level of oversight may help church plans avoid other types of 
litigation exposure in the state courts. Of course, all of these expansions to 
the existing process and heightened agency review and oversight will add 
more complexity and require additional manpower, which could be 
problematic for an agency such as the IRS that is already overstretched in 
terms of personnel.209   
205 ERISA requires pension plans to comply with a host of annual reporting requirements to both 
the DOL and PBGC, as well as participant and beneficiary disclosures, among other obligations. See, 
e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE GUIDE FOR EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLANS
(2014), http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/rdguide.pdf [https://perma.cc/A5WU-XUDP].
206 Advocate Health Care Network v. Stapleton, No.16-74, slip op. at 5 n.2 (U.S. June 5, 2017). 
207 Herman, supra note 24, at 233. 
208 Jeannie O’Sullivan, 4 Takeaways from High Court’s ERISA Exemption Ruling, LAW360 (June 
5, 2017, 8:59 PM), https://www.law360.com/employment/articles/931350/4-takeaways-from-high-
court-s-erisa-exemption-ruling?nl_pk=73f04523-8fa4-4634-862b-c01a8fca8676&utm_source=
newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=employment [https://perma.cc/FDCJ-4WCJ]. 
209 See Lisa Rein, A Standard Dejection in the IRS Help Line, WASH. POST (Apr. 7, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/a-standard-dejection-in-the-irs-help-line/2015/04/07/
333594d6-d7f0-11e4-8103-fa84725dbf9d_story.html [https://perma.cc/UCA8-GTJ5] (“Five years of 
budget cuts by Congress have left the agency so cash-strapped that Commissioner John Koskinen 
doesn’t bother sugarcoating the state of customer service. ‘It’s abysmal,’ he said.”). 
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B. Evaluative Criteria
The balanced approach should allow for a holistic case-by-case 
evaluation of church plans. Key to this balanced approach is determining 
what types of evaluative criteria should be included and what benchmarks 
should be used for evaluation. While Congress would ultimately determine 
the parameters of the evaluation, this Note suggests that the evaluation 
should focus on finding benchmarks that represent a middle ground for 
church plans and pension plan participants.  
The settlement agreement reached in Overall offers a glimpse into 
what a compromise between the two sides could look like, and provides a 
starting point for the types of criteria or representations that could be 
required in a more robust evaluation of church plans. In terms of funding 
concerns, Ascension committed to contribute a one-time $8 million 
infusion in the church plan and guaranteed “sufficient funds to pay 
participants the level of benefit stated in the Plans” through June 2022.210 
Furthermore, Ascension promised to maintain participants’ benefit levels 
should the plan undergo any merger into another plan.211 In addition, it 
agreed to comply with certain ERISA-like standards, including meeting 
fiduciary obligations, distributing a summary plan description that includes 
information about the church plan and alerts participants about the lack of 
PBGC coverage, providing annual funding summaries, issuing pension 
benefit statements every three years, promptly responding to participant 
requests for current benefit values, and outlining claim review 
procedures.212 In return, Ascension got to maintain its church plan status—
shielding it from paying PBGC premiums, having to comply with federal 
agency audit requests, and providing annual Form 5500 reporting—and 
prevent future litigation costs related to plaintiffs’ claims in that case.213 
Of the ERISA-like protections offered in the Ascension settlement 
agreement, the immediate funding infusion and future funding commitment 
are obviously very important concerns for the plaintiffs involved in this 
series of litigation and are likely the thorniest issues for church plan 
sponsors as well. However, given that the intent behind the church plan 
exemption was not to allow church plans to sidestep funding their plans, 
but rather to avoid government entanglement with church business, it is not 
so unrealistic to require church plan sponsors to make some meaningful 
210 Class Action Settlement at 11, Overall v. Ascension Health, 23 F. Supp. 3d 816 (E.D. Mich. 
2014) (No. 13-cv-11396-AC-LJM). 
211 Id. 
212 Id. at 12. 
213 Id. at 4. 
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commitments in terms of funding. Congress could outline an improved 
church plan determination process that would allow the IRS to give church 
plan status affirmation only where a plan proves a sufficient level of 
funding and makes representations to maintain these levels for a certain 
period of time, based on actuarial assumptions about the plan’s future 
liabilities. Furthermore, it could be optional to allow the IRS to provide 
church plan status on a trial or temporary basis (e.g., one year) for plans 
that fall below the sufficient level of funding within a certain range, so long 
as they commit to future funding infusions. Again, building in evaluation of 
funding levels into the IRS’s church plan approval process will likely 
require more specialized personnel.  
Another significant concern in terms of funding representations is 
what happens in the case of plan failure. ERISA has built in the PBGC 
insurance mechanism to deal with plan failures, whereas participants in 
church plans do not have that type of assurance for a minimum guaranteed 
level of pension payout. However, even the act of formalizing the church 
plan approval process sets up some additional oversight in terms of 
funding. If the church plan status is limited in duration and requires a re-
application or renewal requirement, this extra level of oversight will 
hopefully flag potential funding issues for the IRS. If plans fail to meet 
objectives after the trial period, their church plan status would lapse and 
they would be forced to become ERISA compliant, including potentially 
requiring them to retroactively pay PBGC premiums to fund their portion 
of the PBGC safety net during their trial period. Furthermore, in terms of 
plan failure, pension plan participants in the church plans could seek 
remedies in contract against the plans under state law.  
In addition to funding commitments, a more balanced approach may 
attempt to incorporate other ERISA-like protections for church plan 
participants. Similar to their expected response to stronger funding 
commitments, church plan sponsors are likely to oppose an obligation to 
provide total or near total ERISA compliance due to the associated 
financial and personnel burdens. In particular, church plan sponsors will be 
most strongly opposed to complying with fiduciary obligations, which 
would give participants stronger leverage in litigation against the plans. 
However, church plan sponsors may be more willing to meet in the middle 
on some of the other more minimally burdensome disclosure requirements. 
This is illustrated in the Overall settlement, where Ascension agreed to 
provide participants and beneficiaries with summary plan descriptions and 
annual funding summaries. 
An important piece of a balanced approach will be an evaluation of a 
church plan’s reasons for seeking church plan status. While the way the 
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plan was operated prior to application for church plan status should not be 
dispositive as to whether church plan status should be granted, it should be 
considered. In particular, if the IRS reviews a plan and finds the sole 
motivation is to get around ERISA compliance,214 the IRS should apply 
heightened scrutiny in its consideration of other factors such as the stability 
of plan funding levels and the strength of the religious ties. A multifactor 
balancing approach such as this will help serve as a gatekeeper to prevent 
those plans acting in bad faith (e.g., entities with very attenuated religious 
connections looking to skirt ERISA compliance) from obtaining church 
plan status, while protecting those religious entities that may simply not 
have realized their eligibility for church plan status.  
The last important criterion that should be incorporated into a 
balanced approach is the extent of the religious ties of the church plan 
applicant to a church or churches. As with many aspects of other regulatory 
schemes,215 Congress felt compelled to shield religious entities from 
ERISA’s requirements to avoid government entanglement with church 
business.216 While some may argue for discarding this antiquated rationale 
or worry that delving into the extent of a religious connection is entering 
dangerous territory, religious ties remain an important area for evaluation. 
One would similarly want to examine the strength of the ties of a quasi-
public entity to a government entity to determine its eligibility for a similar 
type of exemption.  
Furthermore, the IRS is already in the business of evaluating churches 
for other tax purposes and has developed criteria to do so.217 While “[t]he 
214 This is not to say that escaping ERISA compliance is not a valid reason to seek church plan 
status. ERISA compliance costs can be enormous and require substantial company resources and 
personnel. However, if avoidance of ERISA compliance is the sole reason, the IRS will want to make 
sure the other factors are sufficiently met (i.e., that the entity has a sufficiently funded plan or is willing 
to commit to certain funding requirements and that the entity is sufficiently connected to a church). 
Some may question the IRS’s ability to detect whether avoidance is the sole motivation. However, there 
may be some signals to alert the IRS such as a very recent affiliation with a church occurring in close 
proximity to a church plan PLR application, see supra notes 75–77 and accompanying text, or strong 
opposition by former employees when provided with the church plan application notice required under 
Revenue Procedure 2011-44, see supra notes 82–85 and accompanying text. 
215 See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 147.131 (2015) (establishing an exemption for religious employers and an 
accommodation for certain other eligible employers from the contraceptive mandate requirement in the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act). 
216 See 124 CONG. REC. 12,106 (1978) (statement of Rep. Conable) (explaining that Congress 
“exempted church plans from the provisions of [ERISA] to avoid excessive Government entanglement 
with religion in violation of the first amendment to the Constitution”). 
217 “Churches” Defined, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/Charities-&-Non-Profits/Churches-&-Religious-
Organizations/Churches—Defined [https://perma.cc/YRM3-E7F6]; see also IRS, TAX GUIDE FOR 
CHURCHES & RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS 33 (2015), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p1828.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2LJ4-SADJ]. 
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term church is found, but not specifically defined, in the Internal Revenue 
Code,” the agency relies on attributes it has developed, as well as 
characteristics identified in case law, and “generally uses a combination of 
these characteristics, together with other facts and circumstances, to 
determine whether an organization is considered a church for federal tax 
purposes.”218 The IRS could borrow some of these criteria for examining 
religious connections between church plan applicants and churches. 
Specific to church plans, the IRS also already makes evaluative 
determinations for the maintenance prong of the church plan definition as 
to whether an entity is a “principal purpose” entity that is sufficiently 
controlled or associated with a church.219 Some of the PLRs the IRS has 
issued have sets of facts where the agency has determined this control or 
association element is not sufficiently met, finding “merely incidental” 
connections to be inadequate.220 The evaluation of this religious tie criterion 
could build off of this already existing “principal purpose entity” 
assessment. 
C. Legislative Solution
The ideal channel for implementing a balanced approach to the church 
plan-determination process would be through Congress, particularly now 
that the Supreme Court has weighed in on the church plan definition. A 
legislative solution would provide refreshed insight for courts into 
congressional intent around the church plan exemption. If Congress revisits 
the issue, it would also provide the opportunity for congressional hearings 
and stakeholder feedback on what the balanced, more robust approach 
should look like.221 This is particularly important, given the large-scale 
consolidation and other changes that have occurred for some religiously 
218 “Churches” Defined, IRS, supra note 217. 
219 See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(33)(C) (2012). 
220 See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 14-20-028 (Feb. 18, 2014), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
wd/1420028.pdf [https://perma.cc/5855-FBMU] (“[The plan] will not be a church plan merely because 
the entities sponsoring [the plan] are associated with the same religious denomination. . . . The 
connections must show an ongoing active relationship between each entity and the designated church. 
In this case, you have not demonstrated that a church . . . [sufficiently] controls [the entities].”). 
221 THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS: COMMITTEE CONSIDERATION, CONGRESS.GOV,
https://www.congress.gov/legislative-process/committee-consideration [https://perma.cc/KQ8Q-2GSH] 
(“The first formal committee action on a bill or issue might be a hearing, which provides a forum at 
which committee members and the public can hear about the strengths and weaknesses of a proposal 
from selected parties—like key executive branch agencies, relevant industries, and groups representing 
interested citizens.”). 
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affiliated entities over the last few decades, such as in the hospital 
industry.222  
Another advantage to Congress completely redrawing the statutory 
church plan definition is that it would allow for more sweeping changes. 
The IRS—and the Supreme Court—could only operate within the statutory 
quagmire left by the 1980 amendments, but if Congress revisits and 
revamps the language, it could outline the structure of a more robust 
evaluation process and offer guidance to the IRS as to how it expects the 
agency to roll out this evaluation process and oversee church plans. As 
opposed to non-precedential administrative guidance like PLRs, Congress 
could require that the IRS implement the process through regulation, which 
would require compliance with the Administrative Procedures Act223 and 
offer notice-and-comment opportunities to solicit stakeholder feedback. 
This type of regulatory implementation would provide a much stronger 
foundation for the IRS’s interpretation to withstand future judicial 
review.224 A legislative solution accompanied by implementation via 
regulation would serve both sides well, as it would provide consistency and 
reliability for plan sponsors as well as stronger assurances to participants. 
Of course, political realities could make it more challenging to find a 
common middle ground, as both sides have active lobbyists and trade 
organizations.225 In addition, the Trump Administration has signaled it 
favors less regulation, not more,226 so even if a legislative solution of this 
nature were to pass Congress, it is unclear whether President Trump would 
sign it. Furthermore, Congress has had multiple opportunities in the past to 
“fix” the church plan definition and has abstained.227 Most recently, in 
December 2015, Congress enacted the Church Plan Clarification Act of 
2015, and the bill’s co-sponsor specifically commented that the bill was not 
222 See supra note 14 and accompanying text. See also Advocate Health Care Network v. 
Stapleton, No.16-74, slip op. at 2–3 (U.S. June 5, 2017) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
223 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559 (2012). 
224 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001) (“[A]dministrative implementation 
of a particular statutory provision qualifies for Chevron deference when it appears that Congress 
delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency 
interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.”). 
225 The Catholic Health Association of the United States, the Church Alliance, and the Pension 
Rights Center are all seasoned players on Capitol Hill. 
226 See Exec. Order No. 13771, 82 Fed. Reg. 9339 (Feb. 3, 2017) (“[I]t is essential to manage the 
costs associated with the governmental imposition of private expenditures required to comply with 
Federal regulations. Toward that end, it is important that for every one new regulation issued, at least 
two prior regulations be identified for elimination, and that the cost of planned regulations be prudently 
managed and controlled through a budgeting process.”). 
227 See supra notes 45–48 and accompanying text. 
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intended to address the church plan definition.228 This could be a strong 
signal that Congress may not be open to making further changes to the 
church plan definition. Nonetheless, the commentary and legislation also 
indicates that church plans are very much on Congress’s radar. 
While a legislative solution could be quite ambitious to undertake, this 
avenue would allow each side to shape the balanced solution and influence 
where benchmarks are set, as well as provide opportunity for meaningful 
and expansive reforms to the church plan approval process.  
CONCLUSION 
While the Supreme Court has recently weighed in on the wave of 
church plan litigation and endorsed a broad interpretation of the church 
plan exemption in Advocate Health Care Network v. Stapleton, concerns 
remain and the church plan exemption is worth revisiting. Congress should 
take action to implement a balanced approach for evaluating church plan 
applicants. This balanced approach should investigate an applicant’s 
religious ties, purposes for seeking church plan status, and funding levels of 
its plan. Doing so not only would benefit church plans by providing them 
with a stable and more reliable framework for operating their plans, but 
also would provide necessary assurances for church plan participants.  
228 See supra note 49. 
